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VICTIMS, RIGHT?
Anna Roberts †

In criminal contexts, a “victim” is typically defined as someone who has been
harmed by a crime. Yet the word commonly appears in legal contexts that precede
the adjudication of whether a crime has occurred. Each U.S. state guarantees
“victims’ rights,” including many that apply pre-adjudication; ongoing “Marsy’s
Law” efforts seek to expand and constitutionalize them nationwide. At trial,
advocates, judges, and jury instructions employ this word even though the existence
or not of crime (and thus of a crime victim) is a central question to be decided. This
usage matters in part because of its possible consequences: it risks obscuring and
weakening the defense side of our two-sided system. Changing the language is thus
a reasonable reform. But the usage matters also because of the underlying impulses,
assumptions, and realities that it reveals. An exploration of those helps to illuminate
broader concerns that require systemic, rather than merely linguistic, change.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars argue that we are in a post-trial world, 1 and bemoan the
circumstances under which the predominant form of criminal
conviction—the guilty plea—is imposed: 2 too early in the process, 3 with

1 See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 2173 (2014).
2 See, e.g., Anna Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2511–22 (2020).
3 See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 443, 454 (2001).
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too much haste, 4 and with too little evidence, 5 contestation, 6 scrutiny, 7
and regulation. 8 But what if crime commission was being declared via
another prevalent mechanism, which operates still earlier and quicker,
and which garners even less attention, opposition, or restriction? This
Article highlights an example of language use—the use of “victim” in
pre-adjudication contexts 9—and argues that it risks playing this role. 10
If we have a victim, then we had a crime; if we had a crime, then we have
someone who committed a crime. If language is doing this kind of work,
a burden is being lifted inappropriately from the prosecution.
The predominant legal definition of a “victim” in criminal
contexts—found in cases, statutes, and constitutions, and endorsed by
Black’s Law Dictionary 11—is a person who has been harmed by a crime,
and yet legal uses of the word to refer to someone alleged to have been
harmed by a crime are widespread. This issue has particular
contemporary salience as the backers of state constitutional
amendments, known collectively as “Marsy’s Law,” target state after
state with provisions offering “victims’ rights” (including preadjudication rights). 12 Kentucky passed a Marsy’s Law amendment in
2020; 13 Wisconsin’s 2020 vote and Pennsylvania’s 2019 vote to do the
same are the subject of ongoing litigation. 14 This issue emerges also in
See id. at 484.
See id. at 450–51.
6 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126
HARV. L. REV. 150 (2012).
7 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2475 (2004).
8 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987–90 (2002).
9 This Article will use phrases such as “alleged victims,” “complainants,” and “complaining
witnesses” in place of “victims,” but will discuss, in Section III.A, some of the problems with these
and other popular terms.
10 See, e.g., Carr v. Haas, No. 17-2527, 2019 WL 2644732, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 2019).
11 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “victim” as “[a] person harmed by a crime, tort, or other
wrong.” Victim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
12 See infra Section I.A.
13 Kentucky Secretary of State, Election Ballot, http://web.sos.ky.gov/ballots/Allen%
202020G.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8DG-P9RQ]; Marsy’s Law takes effect in Kentucky, WHAS11
(Nov. 20, 2020, 2:08 PM), https://www.whas11.com/article/news/kentucky/marsys-law-takeseffect-kentucky-crime-victims-election-2020/417-dc3afcd6-9b66-4d29-acb0-509299b13647.
14 See Wis. Just. Initiative, Inc. v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, No. 2019-CV-3485, 2020 Wisc.
Cir. LEXIS 11 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2020) (finding Wisconsin ballot question “did not meet all
constitutional and statutory requirements necessary to adequately inform the public on the purpose
of the amendments upon which they were voting”); Brief for Petitioner, Wis. Just. Initiative, Inc.
v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 2021 WL 640101 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2021) (No. 2020AP002003)
(appealing decision), League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar, 219 A.3d 594 (Pa. 2019)
(upholding preliminary injunction); League of Women Voters of PA v. Boockvar, ACLU PA.,
https://www.aclupa.org/en/cases/league-women-voters-pa-v-boockvar [https://perma.cc/XM2D4
5
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trial practice, which reveals numerous instances of each of the relevant
players—judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, witnesses, and the
drafters of jury instructions—referring, pre-adjudication, to the
“victim” in the case. 15
This tension between legal usage and legal definition—and indeed
between legal usage and foundational premises relating to the
presumption of innocence 16—often goes unacknowledged. 17 Marsy’s
Law provisions typically define a “victim” as someone who has been
harmed by a crime, 18 even while explicitly extending their protections
to those who are pre-adjudication. 19 In litigation, powerful voices have
challenged this usage—Kobe Bryant, Bill Cosby, and Jeffrey Epstein
have all been embroiled in this 20—but even when courts recognize the
error their most frequent conclusion is that it was harmless. 21
Analysis of this phenomenon is critically important, however.
First, this needs to be understood as a language usage that is far from
isolated. Throughout our legal language, and often unchallenged, are
terms that appear to prejudge aspects of the adjudicative process. These
include the widespread use of “offender” in place of “alleged
offender,” 22 “offense” in place of “alleged offense,” 23 and “recidivism”
22Y5]; League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Kathy Boockvar, 578 M.D. 2019, 2021 WL
62268 (Pa. Cmmw. Jan. 7, 2021) (finding Pennsylvania ballot measure unconstitutional); Anna
Orso, The Wolf Administration Won’t Appeal a State Court Ruling that Tossed Victim-Rights Law
Overwhelmingly Supported by Voters, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/
news/pennsylvania/marsys-law-pennsylvania-victim-rights-wolf-appeal-20210209 html
[https://perma.cc/HV3N-FPB5] (confirming that an appeal is underway).
15 See infra Section I.B.
16 See People v. Solano, No. B222662, 2011 WL 1833375, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2011)
(“Solano argues characterizing the officers as victims prior to argument . . . undermines the
presumption of innocence by sending a message to the jury [that] the People’s version of events
is the correct one.”).
17 See Geoffrey Sant, “Victimless Crime” Takes on a New Meaning: Did California’s Victims’
Rights Amendment Eliminate the Right to be Recognized as a Victim?, 39 J. LEGIS. 43, 43 (2013)
(noting that “to date there has been virtually no academic discussion of Marsy’s Law”).
18 See A Model Constitutional Amendment to Afford Victims Equal Rights, MARSY’S LAW, at
4,
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/marsyslawforall/legacy_url/1090/Marsy-s-LawModel-Constitutional-Amendment.pdf?1533058099 [https://perma.cc/K62T-4L92] [hereinafter
MARSY’S LAW, Model Constitutional Amendment].
19 See id. at 1.
20 See infra Section I.B.; infra notes 323–25 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 177–91 and accompanying text.
22 See Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 1009–10 (2019) [hereinafter
Roberts, Arrests as Guilt].
23 See id; U.S. CONST. amend. V (“the same offence”); U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The
trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in
the state where the said crimes shall have been committed . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”).
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to refer to re-arrest. 24 Second, it is important to study these language
usages because of dangerous tendencies that their widespread use (and
the acquiescence thereto) both exacerbates and reveals.
These kinds of usages and the acquiescence thereto both
exacerbate and reveal dangerous tendencies such as the following:
assumptions of guilt that bypass the evidentiary process; assumptions
that claims by law enforcement or by complainants equate to crimes;
the dominance of law enforcement narratives and vocabulary; and
assumptions that law enforcement accounts are truthful, accurate, and
neutral. These tendencies threaten the rights of defendants, the viability
of defenses, and the role of defense counsel.
The role played by the word “victim” also highlights some of the
inadequacies in our treatment of those who are harmed by crime. The
use of the word “victim” (like the criminal system itself) has come to be
seen as a way of bestowing dignity and respect. 25 Yet within our criminal
system what is offered is, at best, a partial and instrumental form of
dignity and respect, one that is tied to a willingness to cooperate, 26 and
one that represents a paltry substitute for deeper forms of dignity and
respect. 27
This Article considers two possible ways to tackle these concerns,
starting with a reformist approach. One might focus on the risks that
this usage exacerbates, and recommend language change in response.
The Article proposes reforms addressing the language use of judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, the police, and those responsible for jury
instructions. This reform is far from straightforward, however, given
the widespread family of usages that reform of this type would have to
counter, the lack of obvious alternative terms, and the risk that this kind
of reform effort might entrench aspects of the existing system. 28
A second option is to focus on the impulses that lie behind such
usages. 29 This Article mentions a variety of possibilities, each of which
connects this issue with broad areas of concern regarding the criminal
See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 1009–10.
See infra Section II.A.
26 Stacy Caplow, What if There is No Client?: Prosecutors as “Counselors” of Crime Victims, 5
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 12 (1998) (mentioning “the paradox that the prosecutor must forge a bond
in order to motivate the victim, but may abandon the victim when his or her cooperation is no
longer necessary”).
27 See id.
28 To be consistent, one would have to tackle other usages that merge allegation with crime,
such as pre-adjudication usages of “rape kit” and “crime scene.” See infra Section III.A. Note also
the concerns about ways in which “reformist reforms” can serve to entrench the criminal system.
See infra Sections III.B–C.
29 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 1010–12 (making analogous point that
common error regarding plea bargain prevalence occurs because incorrect figure fits with
widespread assumptions).
24
25
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system. First, the Article suggests that this word has come to bear the
weight of signaling respect and dignity for those claiming crime—
weight that the system more broadly has failed, and still fails, to bear.
Second, like many common terms, it signals premature assumptions of
criminal wrongdoing. Third, it hints at the pervasiveness, dominance,
and perceived neutrality of law enforcement framing. Fourth, by
deploying the language of crime even absent a crime as defined by law,
it sheds light on a “rough and ready” or “I know it when I see it” concept
of crime, which exists in fascinating and problematic tension with our
legal definitions. And finally, it does something simpler: in suggesting
that the line of adjudication is blurred, it reflects our reality. Lines are
frequently drawn in our system that play a role more central than the
supposedly central line of adjudication: lines drawn at arrest and
charge, and bail setting, and indeed at birth.
While these potential impulses behind the word open up expansive
areas of inquiry, it is important to start to unpack them. As calls for
abolition enter the mainstream, 30 one fear that they may spark is the
fear of giving up what we have. To evaluate the promise of abolition
requires an accurate examination of what we actually have; requires
shedding myths. 31 And if we find that our system is indeed one where
in many ways that central line of adjudication is a blur, where we aren’t
ruled by definitions, or by other structures said to make the process fair
and the punishment justified, where judgments of guilt do not await the
point of adjudication, we may be more willing to explore other ways—
less contingent ways—of according respect and dignity.
Part I examines two legal settings in which the pre-adjudication
use of “victim” repeatedly appears: first, the various state constitutional
amendments that bestow the language of “victim” and attendant rights
on those who are pre-adjudication, and second the litigated uses of
“victim” to refer to complaining witnesses during trial. 32 It highlights
not just the dangers posed by this usage, but the troubling tendencies
revealed by this usage and by instances of acquiescence thereto. Part II
30 Abolition is understood in a variety of ways, but as described in one recent account,
abolitionists “work toward eliminating prisons and police, and building an alternate and varied
set of political, economic, and social arrangements or institutions to respond to many of the social
ills to which prison and police now respond.” Amna Akbar, Teaching Penal Abolition, L. & POL.
ECON. PROJECT (July 15, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/07/15/teaching-abolition
[https://perma.cc/29L8-9TD2].
31 See Amna A. Akbar, How Defund and Disband Became the Demands, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(June 15, 2020), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/06/15/how-defund-and-disband-becamethe-demands/?lp_txn_id=992867 [https://perma.cc/CXG7-K67W] (“Abolitionists are often
caricatured as having unattainable ends and an impractical agenda. But many organizations, like
Survived and Punished and generationFIVE have demonstrated the failure of our system even
on its own terms . . . .”).
32 See supra note 9 for the terminology that this Article will use.
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expands on the dangers, examining not just threats to defendants and
defenses, and thus to our two-sided adversary system, but also the
impoverished nature of this usage (and of criminal prosecution more
broadly) as a means of bestowing dignity and respect. Part III discusses
potential reform efforts aimed at tackling these dangers. Part IV posits
that if reform is attempted, it ought to be paired with efforts to
understand some of the assumptions, impulses, and forces that
perpetuate this usage; it presents some possibilities, before considering
their implications for current discussions of abolition.
I.

PRE-ADJUDICATION USES OF “VICTIM”

This Part examines two contexts in which “victim” is used before
there has been an adjudication of guilt: state constitutional amendments
and trial litigation. First, a few notes about framing and scope. “Victim”
is of course used in a variety of contexts—some legal, some not, and
within legal contexts some criminal and some not. As one court has
said, “[t]he term ‘victim’ is a “malleable term” the meaning of which
depends on the context in which it is used.’” 33 To the extent possible,
this Article attempts to focus on those contexts where one has reason to
expect that a legal definition is in play. (Jury instructions are a
particularly clear example). Given this focus, one can turn, as many
courts do, 34 to Black’s Law Dictionary for a working definition. 35 For
the last twenty years, Black’s has defined “victim” as “a person harmed
by a crime, tort, or other wrong.” 36 Even this may be a somewhat more
capacious definition than is appropriate in many of the contexts
discussed in this Article, where one might conclude that “a person
harmed by a crime” is the relevant definition.
In addition to the dictionary definition of “victim,” one has to
acknowledge the variety of associations or overtones that accompany

33 People v. Ruiz, No. B278461, 2018 WL 4292027, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2018) (quoting
Santos v. Brown, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)).
34 See, e.g., State v. Morock, No. 14AP–559, 2015 WL 4660026, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6,
2015); State v. Skipintheday, 704 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (“Absent a statutory or
caselaw definition of the word, we turn to a common lexical meaning; A victim is a person
harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong.”) (quoting Victim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.
1999)).
35 Other definitions exist, some of which courts invoke. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 142
F.3d 702, 710–11 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that the definitions of “victim” provided in Black’s Law
Dictionary and Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary vary in scope).
36 Victim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 7th ed. (1999). No definition was given in the first four
editions. The 5th (1979) and 6th (1990) editions had “[t]he person who is the object of a crime
or tort.”
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the word. To call someone a “victim” may be to trigger a variety of
assumptions: if someone is a victim then they may seem to need
sympathy, 37 protection and help, 38 and indeed “justice.” 39 They are on
the side of right. 40 They are not supposed to be blamed or shamed. 41
Even while focusing on the ways in which “victim” appears to pre-judge
crime commission, this Article does not ignore these other aspects of
the word’s meaning. Indeed, they may help illustrate some of the
significance of the prevalence of “victim” pre-adjudication: the more we
become accustomed to thinking of complainants as victims, 42 the more
natural it may seem to guarantee them rights.
Finally, there are all sorts of objections to the word “victim” other
than the one that this Article addresses. It may be said to convey an
unhelpful sense of weakness, damage, subordination, or lack of
agency. 43 Those objections have received considerable scholarly
treatment. 44 To the extent possible, this Article puts them to one side,
to focus on one that has not: the implications of the usage—and of its
37 See United States v. Edwards, No. CR 16-103-BLG-SPW-1, 2017 WL 4159365, at *1 (D.
Mont. Sept. 19, 2017).
38 See Jonathan Simon, Megan’s Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 1111, 1112 (2000).
39 See Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 971–72 (1985)
(“‘Justice’ in this context presumably means that the victim should be entitled to have the accused
incarcerated without any formal adjudication of guilt.”) [hereinafter Henderson, The Wrongs];
Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596, 1607 (1996) (reviewing
GEORGE FLETCHER, JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)) (quoting
George Fletcher as asserting that “[t]he purpose of the trial is to stand by the victim,” and adding
her view that “the (admittedly formal) presumption of innocence disappears under this theory,
and trials become a distorted Durkheimesque ritual of condemnation and social cohesion rather
than a determination of guilt.”) (alteration in original).
40 See Henderson, The Wrongs, supra note 39, at 952 (“Unfortunately, the symbolic strength
of the term ‘victim’s rights’ overrides careful scrutiny: Who could be anti-victim? Thus, liberals
find themselves caught in yet another apparent paradox: To be solicitous of a defendant’s rights
is to be antivictim.”); Simon, supra note 38, at 1136 (quoting Janet Reno as saying that “I draw
most of my strength from victims, for they represent America to me: people who will not be put
down, people who will not be defeated, people who will rise again and stand again for what is
right. . . . You are my heroes and heroines. You are but little lower than the angels.”).
41 See Buszkiewic v. State, 424 P.3d 1272, 1280–81 (Wyo. 2018).
42 See supra note 9 for the terminology that this Article will use.
43 See Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1993) (“The
victim is helpless, decimated, pathetic, weak, and ignorant.”); Olivia Fleming, Chanel Miller and
Evan Rachel Wood Unearth the Aftermath of Sexual Assault, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/features/a29554899/chanel-miller-evan-rachel-woodwomen-who-dare [https://perma.cc/K8XL-RYGX] (“We do not exist to be a side character in his
story or his victim, we do not belong to the people who hurt us, and we continue to own and
control our own narratives, and they get to be on the sidelines for once.”) (quoting Chanel
Miller).
44 See, e.g., Sarah Buel, Putting Forfeiture to Work, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1295, 1297 n.5
(2010).
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widespread acceptance—for those claiming and accused of crime, and
for our systems of adjudication.
A.

State Constitutional Amendments

More than thirty states have amended their constitutions to add
“victims’ rights” provisions. 45 None of these amendments restricts its
applicability to the post-conviction context, 46 and indeed the trend is
toward pre-adjudication rights being spelled out with more force and
more numerosity. 47
These amendments have arrived in two waves, the second of which
is still swelling. The first wave began in 1982, the year in which
President Reagan’s “Task Force on Victims of Crime” produced a
lengthy report on “victims’ rights.” 48 The Report appended a proposed
constitutional amendment, which was geared at the federal
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, 49 but which acted as a catalyst for
state constitutional amendments. 50 California passed one that same
year, 51 and thirty-one states followed in the 1980s and 1990s. 52
Of that first wave of amendments, while some do not make it
explicit that they apply pre-adjudication, 53 others make clear that they
45 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Litigation is pending in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, in connection
with the Marsy’s Law provisions passed in those states.
46 See infra.
47 See sources cited infra notes 75–76.
48 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982),
https://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/media/document/87299.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FKE8-FLGH]
49 The proposal was to add the following sentence to the Sixth Amendment: “Likewise, the
victim, in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to be present and to be heard at all
critical stages of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 114–15.
50 See Don Siegelman & Courtney W. Tarver, Victims’ Rights in State Constitutions, 1
EMERGING ISSUES STATE CONST. L. 163, 164 (1988).
51 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a) (1982).
52 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01 (enacted 1994); Alaska (1994); Arizona (1990); Colorado (1992);
Connecticut (1996); Florida (1988); Idaho (1994); Illinois (1992); Indiana (1996); Kansas (1992);
Louisiana (1998); Maryland (1994); Michigan (1988), Mississippi (1998); Missouri (1992);
Nebraska (1997); Nevada (1996); New Jersey (1991); New Mexico (1992); North Carolina (1996);
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a (enacted 1994); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (enacted 1996); Oregon
(1999); Rhode Island (1986); South Carolina (1996); Tennessee (1998); Texas (1989); Utah
(1994); Virginia (1996); Washington (1989); Wisconsin (1993).
53 See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a (enacted 1994). All of them, however, are open to that
interpretation, thanks to phrases such as “throughout the criminal justice process,” “all phases,”
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do. 54 As regards South Carolina, for example, “a person becomes a
victim the instant the crime is committed or attempted and he or she
suffers a harm.” 55 That state’s supreme court has listed several rights
that “occur prior to indictment,” 56 and has specified that “[i]f the case
proceeds through indictment, the victim gains more rights.”
Examples of pre-adjudication rights include a “right to be
reasonably protected from the accused through the imposition of
appropriate bail or conditions of release by the court,” 57 a “right to
timely disposition of the case following the arrest of the accused,” 58 a
right to “refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by
the defendant,” 59 a right to “confer with the prosecution . . . before trial
or before any disposition of the case,” 60 and a right to “reasonable notice
and to be present and heard during all critical stages of preconviction
and postconviction proceedings.” 61
The second wave consists of amendments setting out state versions
of “Marsy’s Law.” Marsalee (“Marsy”) Nicholas was a twenty-one-yearold woman, who was killed by an ex-boyfriend, Kerry Conley, in 1983. 62
While Conley was out on $100,000 bail, Nicholas’s mother apparently
saw him at a grocery store; she had not previously known that he was at
liberty. 63 This lack of notification spurred legal change. Nicholas’s
brother, Henry Nicholas III, is a billionaire who proceeded to found

or “all crucial stages.” See, e.g., Bellamy v. State, 594 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that the presence of the complainant in the courtroom at trial
pursuant to the “all crucial stages” presence guarantee of the state’s “victims’ rights” provision
violated his due process rights, and noting that to adopt an interpretation of the provision that
was limited to the post-conviction context “would undermine the purpose of the victim’s rights
constitutional amendment” and lead to an “absurd result”).
54 See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28 (mentioning rights that attach “once a criminal
information or indictment charging a crime has been publicly filed in court”).
55 Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81, 85 (2000).
56 Id. ((1) [T]he right to be treated fairly; (2) the right to be informed when the accused is
arrested, released from custody, or has escaped; (3) the right to be informed of any criminal
proceedings which are dispositive of the charges against the accused; (4) the right to be informed
of a hearing affecting bond or bail; and (5) the right to be protected from the accused or persons
acting on his behalf.)
57 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; see MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(2).
58 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24.
59 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1.
60 Id.
61 LA. CONST. art. I, § 25.
62 Lyndon Stambler, Point Dume Man Found Guilty of Murdering His Former Girlfriend, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 18, 1985), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-04-18-we-23880-story.
html [https://perma.cc/VU77-HVM5].
63 See id.
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Marsy’s Law for All LLC, 64 which aims to pass “victims’ rights”
amendments to state constitutions, 65 as well as federally. He reportedly
spent a total of 99.3 million dollars to support Marsy’s Law ballot
measures between 2008 and 2018. 66 Marsy’s Law provisions are on the
books in twelve states, 67 and the rate at which they are arriving has
intensified. 68 Marsy’s Law provisions passed in all six states that had
them on their 2018 ballots. 69 A Pennsylvania version was on the ballot
in November 2019 (because of pending litigation, 70 votes have not been
certified); 71 Wisconsin and Kentucky voters adopted Marsy’s Law
amendments in 2020, though litigation is ongoing in Wisconsin. 72
Other states are said to be considering similar steps. 73 These
amendments adhere more or less closely to a model provision
promulgated by the LLC. 74 They tend to offer a longer list of rights than
the provisions passed during the first wave, 75 and (in contrast to the first
wave) each of them makes explicit its applicability pre-adjudication. 76
In addition to their considerable successes, the Marsy’s Law
backers have encountered several obstacles. Legislatures in New
Hampshire, Alabama, and Idaho voted down Marsy’s Law proposals. 77
64 See Beth Schwartzapfel, The Billionaire’s Crusade, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 22, 2018,
10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/22/nicholas-law [https://perma.cc/
SH5F-RYST].
65 These include notification provisions.
66 BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 13.
67 California (2008), Florida (2018), Georgia (2019), Illinois (2014), Kentucky (2020), Nevada
(2018), North Carolina (2019), North Dakota (2018), Ohio (2018), Oklahoma (2018), South
Dakota (2016 and then in an amended version in 2018), Wisconsin (2020).
68 See Jason Moon, How One Group Is Pushing Victims’ Rights Laws Across the Country, NPR
(Mar. 29, 2018, 2:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/29/597684647/how-one-group-isseeding-victims-rights-laws-across-the-country [https://perma.cc/YFF7-659T].
69 Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, and Oklahoma.
70 See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar, 219 A.3d 594 (Pa. 2019).
71 See Sheryl Delozier, We Can Protect Victims and Reform Criminal Justice at the Same Time,
PA. CAP.-STAR (Apr. 7, 2019), https://www.penncapital-star.com/commentary/we-can-protectvictims-and-reform-criminal-justice-at-the-same-time-this-is-how-opinion [https://perma.cc/
8H2V-NPR5].
72 BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 13; S.J. Res. 2., 2019 Leg. (Wis. 2019); see also sources cited supra
note 16.
73 See State Efforts, MARSY’S LAW, https://www.marsyslaw.us/states [https:// perma.cc/2579W8CT] (mentioning Mississippi, Idaho, Iowa, New Hampshire, Maine, and Kentucky).
74 See MARSY’S LAW, Model Constitutional Amendment, supra note 18.
75 See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 134 N.E.3d 710 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (stating that the Marsy’s
Law amendment “expands the rights afforded to victims of crimes”).
76 See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. I, § 25 (noting that “all victims shall be entitled to the following
rights, beginning at the time of their victimization . . . .”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (same).
77 Jeanne Hruska, ‘Victims’ Rights’ Proposals Like Marsy’s Law Undermine Due Process,
ACLU (May 3, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/victims-rights-
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In addition, state courts struck down proposed amendments in
Kentucky and Montana, 78 and another has granted a preliminary
injunction precluding the tabulation and certification of votes in
Pennsylvania. 79 Whereas the rulings in Kentucky and Montana focused
on procedural violations, 80 the Pennsylvania court emphasized the
enormity of the implications of Marsy’s Law for criminal defendants. 81
Indeed, the court concluded that “it is clear that the Proposed
Amendment, by its plain language, will immediately, profoundly, and
irreparably impact individuals who are accused of crimes, the criminal
justice system as a whole, and most likely victims as well.” 82 The court
noted the amendment’s assertion that the rights contained therein were
to be “protected in a manner no less vigorous than the rights afforded
to the accused,” 83 and listed some of the hazards for defendants’ rights:
the right to full and effective investigations would be harmed, as would
the rights to confront witnesses and to enforce subpoenas compelling
cooperation. 84 The proposed amendment would also alter the right to a
speedy trial, the right against double jeopardy, the right to pretrial
release, the right to post-conviction relief, and the right to appeal. 85 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the injunction, and litigation
continues. 86
proposals-marsys-law-undermine-due-process [https://perma.cc/C6Z5-ZK65] (contrasting this
with success in states that only require signatures in order to get on the ballot).
78 For Kentucky, see Westerfield v. Ward, 599 S.W.3d 738 (Ky. 2019); John Cheves, Kentucky
Supreme Court Strikes Down Marsy’s Law, Says Ballot Wording was too Vague, LEXINGTON
HERALD LEADER (June 13, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.kentucky.com/news/politicsgovernment/article231511858.html [https://perma.cc/7AKH-SNSF]. For Montana, see Mont.
Ass’n of Ctys. v. State, 404 P.3d 733 (Mont. 2017).
79 League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar, No. 578 M.D. 2019, 2019 Pa. Commw.
Unpub. LEXIS 623 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 30, 2019). Litigation is also ongoing in Wisconsin.
80 Kentucky’s amendment was found to have violated the state constitution because the full
text was not placed on the ballot and was not published. See Westerfield, 599 S.W.3d 738.
Montana’s amendment was struck down because it made changes to the constitution that were
substantive and not closely related, and thus violated the separate vote requirement. See Mont.
Ass’n of Ctys., 404 P.3d 733.
81 See Boockvar, 2019 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 623, at *19–21.
82 Id. at *19. Petitioners had called an experienced criminal defense attorney, who testified
that the changes would “eviscerate his ability to effectively represent his clients,” affecting his
ability to get discovery, cross-examine, negotiate pleas, build a defense, and ensure that his clients
were afforded their right to a speedy trial. See id. at *9–14.
83 Id. This language is also found in the model amendment and in several other state versions.
See MARSY’S LAW, supra note 74.
84 See Boockvar, 2019 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 623, at *19–21.
85 See id. at *37.
86 See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar, 219 A.3d 594, 594 (Pa. 2019); see also
Boockvar, 2019 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 623, at *19–21; League of Women Voters of
Pennsylvania v. Kathy Boockvar, 578 M.D. 2019, 2021 WL 62268 (Pa. Cmmw. Jan. 7, 2021)
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The fact that both sets of constitutional provisions offer preadjudication rights to “victims” (sometimes implicitly in the first wave,
but always explicitly in the second) presents a tension, given that the
provisions might appear to assume commission of crime before
adjudication has occurred. States address this in various ways, all
problematic. Georgia does the most to avoid the problem of apparent
prejudgment by defining “victim” to mean “alleged victim,” 87 though
this willingness to define a term to mean something quite different from
its legal dictionary definition is strange. 88 Oregon also does more than
most states to reveal that “victimhood” rests on something less than an
adjudication, and to gesture at the power of law enforcement to make
an authoritative decision about who is a “victim.” Oregon’s constitution
defines “victim” to mean “any person determined by the prosecuting
attorney or the court to have suffered financial, psychological or
physical harm as a result of a crime . . . .” 89 Many states instead simply
define “victim” to mean someone who has been harmed by a crime; 90
the fact that they do that while guaranteeing pre-adjudication rights
suggests a willingness to treat a claim of crime as the same as the
occurrence of a crime. For example, the Arizona provision states that
“‘[v]ictim’ means a person against whom the criminal offense has been
committed.” 91 At the same time, in Arizona, victims’ rights “attach
when a defendant is arrested or formally charged” (that is, before

(finding Pennsylvania ballot measure unconstitutional); Anna Orso, The Wolf Administration
Won’t Appeal a State Court Ruling that Tossed Victim-Rights Law Overwhelmingly Supported by
Voters, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvania/marsyslaw-pennsylvania-victim-rights-wolf-appeal-20210209.html
[https://perma.cc/HV3N-FPB5]
(confirming that an appeal is underway).
87 See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XXX (“For the purpose of this Paragraph, a victim shall be
considered an individual against whom a crime has allegedly been perpetrated . . .”).
88 Compare id., with FED. R. EVID. 412(d) (“In this rule, ‘victim’ includes an alleged victim.”)
The states are split on whether to follow the FRE drafters. See Ya’ara Barnoon & Elena Sytcheva,
Rape, Sexual Assault & Evidentiary Matters, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 459, 471 (2012).
89 OR. CONST. art. I, § 42; id. art. I, § 43. For a similar approach, see Rights of Crime Victims
and Witnesses Act, 725 ILL. STAT. ch. 725, act 120/3(a)(1) (2019) (defining “victim,” for purpose
of constitutional amendment, as “any natural person determined by the prosecutor or the court
to have suffered direct physical or psychological harm as a result of a violent crime perpetrated
or attempted against that person . . .”); People v. Chatman, 66 N.E.3d 415, 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)
(explaining that this statutory definition is the relevant one as regards the Illinois constitutional
amendment); Searcy v. Ada County, No. 34216, 2008 WL 9468621, at *9 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug.
11, 2008) (stating that under Idaho constitutional and statutory law, “a ‘crime victim’ is a person
who has suffered harm as the result of crime which has been charged”); State v. Damato-Kushel,
173 A.3d 357, 362–63 (Conn. 2017) (arrest warrant suffices to establish status as “victim” for
purpose of triggering constitutional rights).
90 See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. I, § 25; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
91 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1.
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adjudication has occurred). 92 Others accord pre-adjudication rights to
“victims” without defining the term. 93 Given that the core dictionary
definition of “victim” in criminal contexts is someone against whom a
criminal offense has been committed, 94 this again suggests a willingness
to treat a claim of crime as the same as the occurrence of a crime.
In reviewing these constitutional provisions, one finds a core set of
recurring rationales. Those rationales include a desire to offer “due
process” to “victims,” 95 as well as things like dignity, respect, and
fairness. 96 The theme of balance is also a prominent, 97 and
problematic, 98 one. The Final Report of the President’s Task Force on
Victims of Crime (released in 1982) repeatedly invoked an interest in
“balance,” 99 and stated that the Task Force’s “sole desire [was] to restore

Z.W. v. Foster, 422 P.3d 582, 583 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24.
94 See Victim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
95 See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
96 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art I, § 24.
97 See Payton v. State, 266 So. 3d 630, 641 (Miss. 2019) (“Because our Constitution balances
the rights of the accused with the rights of the victim, we—as guardians of the Constitution—can
do no less.”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(1)(1) (declaring “[t]he right to be present at all criminal
justice proceedings at which the defendant has such right”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (same);
OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(1) (granting rights for purposes that include “ensur[ing] that a fair balance
is struck between the rights of crime victims and the rights of criminal defendants”); Ohio v.
White, 709 N.E.2d 140, 153 (Ohio 1999) (proponents of Ohio’s first-wave amendment “pointed
out that while [Section] 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution was adopted to protect the rights
of persons accused of crime, there was no corresponding section in the Constitution to protect
the rights of victims of crime, and adoption of this section was thus ‘a question of balance’”);
State v. Lane, 212 P.3d 529, 533 (Utah 2009) (“[T]he language of both the Victims’ Rights
Amendment and the Rights of Crime Victims Act does much to balance the treatment of victims
in criminal cases with that afforded to defendants.”); California General Election Official Voter
Information Guide, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE 62 (2008), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/pdfguide/vig-nov-2008-principal.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4L3-JNA3] (offering argument in favor of
Marsy’s Law amendment that “CALIFORNIA’S CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES RIGHTS
FOR RAPISTS, MURDERERS, CHILD MOLESTERS, AND DANGEROUS CRIMINALS.
PROPOSITION 9 LEVELS THE PLAYING FIELD, GUARANTEEING CRIME VICTIMS THE
RIGHT TO JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS”).
98 See Hruska, supra note 77 (“This opening salvo [in the context of Marsy’s Law] is a
seductive appeal to one’s sense of fairness. However, the notion that victims’ rights can be
equated to the rights of the accused is a fallacy. It ignores the very different purposes these two
sets of rights serve.”); State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1205–06 (Ariz. 1993) (stating that the court
must balance the victim’s rights against those of the defendant if the victim’s rights conflict with
the defendant’s right to a fair trial); Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a
Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1503 (2015) (describing the deceptive allure of symmetry
within the criminal system).
99 See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 48, at 114 (“In
applying and interpreting the vital guarantees that protect all citizens, the criminal justice system
has lost an essential balance.”); id. at vi (system “appallingly out of balance”).
92
93
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a balance to the scales of justice.” 100 The Task Force was careful to say,
however, that it did not intend to threaten the protections held by
criminal defendants. 101 In the first wave of constitutional amendments
one again finds explicit commitments that defendant protections
should not be lessened. 102 Florida’s 1988 amendment, for example,
mentioned that it was not to interfere with the constitutional rights of
the accused. 103 But in the second wave that kind of caveat is gone.
Florida’s 2018 amendment says nothing along those lines. 104 The same
is true of the Marsy’s Law model amendment. 105 Rather, in language
adopted by Florida and North Dakota, 106 the model amendment
declares an aim “to ensure that crime victims’ rights and interests are
respected and protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than the
protections afforded to criminal defendants and juvenile
delinquents . . . .” 107
One can trace a shift not just in this kind of overall stance but in
the specific rights that have been declared. As Professor Mosteller
indicates, a shift has occurred within the “victims’ rights movement,”
from calls for greater participation rights to initiatives that directly
assist the prosecution, and conflict with defendants’ rights and
protections. 108 The Marsy’s Law model amendment, for example, gives
rights to “victims” to influence bail decisions and plea decisions, and to
refuse to provide discovery: 109 all areas in which “victims’ rights” may
be invoked to the detriment of defendants. The Wisconsin amendment
that was in place before that state’s recent vote gave “victims” the
Id. at 119.
See id. at 114 (“It should be clearly understood that this Task Force wishes in no way to
vitiate the safeguards that shelter anyone accused of crime; but it must be urged with equal vigor
that the system has deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its protection.”).
102 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b); CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 8(b)(2) (1996) (stating that the “right to timely disposition of the case” must not abridge any
right of the accused); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (ending with “to the extent that exercising these
rights does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the accused”); KAN. CONST. art. XV,
§ 15; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26A(2) (stating that the section shall not “impair the constitutional
rights of the accused”). But see MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(2).
103 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 2018).
104 Matthew Harwood, Can Victims’ Rights Go Too Far?, REASON (April 2019),
https://reason.com/2019/03/16/can-victims-rights-go-too-far [https://perma.cc/A8W3-8UCG]
(stating that the deletion “prompt[ed] the Florida League of Women Voters to oppose the
effort”).
105 MARSY’S LAW, Model Constitutional Amendment, supra note 18.
106 North Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma; see also Wisconsin proposed amendment.
107 MARSY’S LAW, Model Constitutional Amendment, supra note 18, at 1.
108 See Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to
Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1698–1704 (1997).
109 MARSY’S LAW, Model Constitutional Amendment, supra note 18.
100
101
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“[o]pportunity to attend court proceedings unless the trial court
[found] sequestration [was] necessary to a fair trial for the
defendant;” 110 the Marsy’s Law amendment gave them the right “to be
present at all proceedings involving the case.” 111 Perhaps the future
appears in Missouri’s legislative declaration that the state’s policy is that
“the victim’s rights are paramount to the defendant’s rights.” 112
B.

Litigation Concerning the Pre-Adjudication Use of “Victim”

As regards courtroom uses of “victim” pre-adjudication, judges
have been analyzing this issue since at least 1860, 113 when the Supreme
Court of California reviewed a self-defense case, People v. Williams. 114
The trial judge, apparently seeking to guard against jury discrimination,
had blundered into a different minefield. He charged the jury as follows:
“The fact that the deceased was a Chinaman gave the defendant no
more right to take his life than if he had been a white person; nor did
the fact, if you so find, that the defendant was seeking to enforce the
collection of taxes against another Chinaman, or even against his
victim . . . .” 115

Even while reversing on another issue, the court criticized the
instruction in these terms:
The word victim, in the connection in which it appears, is an
unguarded expression, calculated, though doubtless unintentionally,
to create prejudice against the accused. It seems to assume that the
deceased was wrongfully killed, when the very issue was as to the
character of the killing. . . . [I]t is apparent that in a case of
conflicting proofs, even an equivocal expression coming from the
Judge, may be fatal to the prisoner. When the deceased is referred to
as “a victim,” the impression is naturally created that some unlawful
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9(m) (amended 2020).
BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 13. The new amendment tucks away as its final provision the
following: “This section is not intended and may not be interpreted to supersede a defendant’s
federal constitutional rights or to afford party status in a proceeding to any victim.”; see also Wis.
Justice Initiative v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2019-CV-3485 2020 Wisc. Cir. LEXIS 11 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2020) (finding Wisconsin ballot question “did not meet all constitutional and
statutory requirements necessary to adequately inform the public on the purpose of the
amendments upon which they were voting.”); Brief for Petitioner, Wis. Justice Initiative v. Wis.
Elections Comm'n, No. 2019-CV-3485 2020 Wisc. Cir. LEXIS 11 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2020)
(No. 2020AP002003) 2021 WL 640101 (appealing decision)
112 MO. REV. STAT. § 595.209 (2016).
113 See Andrew Nash, Note, Victims by Definition, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (2008).
114 People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142, 147 (1860).
115 Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
110
111
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power or dominion had been exerted over his person. And it was
nearly equivalent, in effect, to an expression characterizing the
defendant as a criminal. The Court should not, directly or indirectly,
assume the guilt of the accused, nor employ equivocal phrases which
may leave such an impression. The experience of every lawyer shows
the readiness with which a jury frequently catch at intimations of the
Court, and the great deference which they pay to the opinions and
suggestions of the presiding Judge, especially in a closely balanced
case, when they can thus shift the responsibility of a decision of the
issue from themselves to the Court. A word, a look, or a tone may
sometimes, in such cases, be of great or even controlling influence.
A judge cannot be too cautious in a criminal trial in avoiding all
interference with the conclusions of the jury upon the facts; for of
this matter, under our system, they are the exclusive judges. 116

The pre-adjudication usage of “victim” is not just long-standing,
but also pervasive. It appears in jury instructions (and the pattern
instructions, indictments and statutes from which they often draw), 117
verdict forms, 118 judicial remarks, 119 prosecutorial comments and
questions, 120 opening statements, 121 closing arguments, 122 voir dire, 123
defense questions and arguments, 124 and witness testimony. 125
A review of this case law rebuts the assertion that there is nothing
to worry about here. A wide variety of legal grounds for objection have

Id. at 147.
See People v. Lovely, No. F071158, 2018, WL 1980960, at *23 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2018).
118 See Steinman v. Kerestes, No. 10-2398, 2011 WL 3862075 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2011).
119 See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 253 P.3d 136, 144 (Wyo. 2011).
120 See Lovely, 2018 WL 1980960, at *23; Liska v. Anchorage, No. A-6351, 1998 WL 191166
(Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1998).
121 See Liska, 1998 WL 191166.
122 See People v. Allen, No. E065202, 2017, WL 4927712, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2017).
123 See Ivon v. State, No. A-11817, 2017, WL 4334029, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).
124 See, e.g., Grady v. Warden, No. CV144006185S, 2019 WL 1093301, at *6–7 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 28, 2019).
125 See Allen, 2017 WL 4927712.
116
117
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been raised, 126 in regard to usages by judges, 127 witnesses, 128 defense
attorneys, 129 and prosecutors. 130 Courts have found this kind of
objection to have merit in all sorts of cases, 131 including cases
implicating the use of “victim” by defense attorneys, 132 prosecutors, 133
judges, 134 and witnesses. 135 Indeed, in some instances, defense attorneys
126 For example, a violation of one’s right to a fair trial, to an impartial trial, and to trial by
jury; right to a complete defense; subversion of presumption of innocence; violation of Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a jury determination of the facts; reduction of prosecution’s
burden of proof; violation of due process right to present defenses such as self-defense and
justifiable homicide; argumentativeness; improper comment on a complainant’s credibility and
a defendant’s guilt; prejudicial effect that sufficiently exceeded probative value; suggesting to the
jury that the court holds a favorable view of the accuser’s credibility, which dilutes the
presumption of innocence; due process protections such as a fair trial before an impartial judge
and an unprejudiced jury; and prosecutorial impropriety.
127 For example, impropriety of judge’s expressing a personal belief in the credibility of
prosecution witnesses or in a criminal defendant’s guilt; improper comment on the evidence;
judicial nullification of self-defense claim.
128 See Tran v. Davis, No. 4:17-CV-330-Y, 2018 WL 2193925, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2018).
129 See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 256 Cal Rptr. 446, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
130 For example, expression of personal opinion by the prosecutor; impropriety of prosecutor
expressing a personal belief in the credibility of prosecution witnesses or a personal belief in a
criminal defendant’s guilt; improper appeal to the jury’s emotions; inflaming the passions or
prejudices of the jury; improper comment on the weight of the evidence; shifting the burden of
proof.
131 See Tolen v. State, No. A-10159, 2012 WL 104477 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012); Alto v.
State, No. A-10883, 2013 WL 1558157, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2013); Fritzinger v. State,
10 A.3d 603, 610–11 (Del. 2009); Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21, 24–25 (Del. 1991); State v.
Nomura, 903 P.2d 718, 721–23 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, No. 02CA008179, 2003
WL 21509033, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 2, 2003); State v. Almedom, No. 15AP-852, 2016 WL
1461839 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2016); Veteto v. State, 8 S.W.3d 805, 816–17 (Tex. App. 2000);
Order Re Mr. Bryant’s Motion to Preclude References to the Accuser as the “Victim,” People v.
Bryant, No. 03 CR 204 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 28, 2004), https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/
File/Court_Probation/5th_Judicial_District/Cases_of_Interest/People_v_Bryant/05-04/ordr_
re_victim_issue.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YVM-Q972] [hereinafter Order Re Motion to Preclude
References to the Accuser as the “Victim,” People v. Bryant].
132 See, e.g., Grady v. Warden, No. CV144006185S, 2019 WL 1093301, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 28, 2019).
133 See State v. Thompson, 76 A.3d 273, 283–85 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013); State v. Bales, No.
27687, 2007 WL 1087752, at *2 (Haw. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2007); State v. Albino, 24 A.3d 602, 613–
617 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
134 See Bales, 2007 WL 1087752; State v. Brewer, No. W2012-02282-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL
1669807, at *13–14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2014); Talkington v. State, 682 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.
App. 1984); Bratcher v. State, No. 01-08-00610-CR, 2009 WL 1331344, at *9–11 (Tex. App. May
14, 2009); Hernandez v. State, 340 S.W.3d 55, 61–62 (Tex. App. 2011); Simpson v. State, No. 0504-01039-CR, 2005 WL 2995081, at *3 (Tex. App. Nov. 9, 2005); Torres v. State, No. 04-98-00594CR, 1999 WL 89934, at *4 (Tex. App. Feb. 24, 1999); People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142, 146 (1860);
State v. Cortes, 851 A.2d 1230, 1239–40 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); People v. Davis, 423 N.Y.S.2d 229
(N.Y. App. Div. 1979); State v. Philbrick, 669 A.2d 152, 155–156 (Me. 1995).
135 See State v. Then, No. A-1790-06T4, 2009 WL 815453, at *17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Mar. 31, 2009); State v. Sperou, 442 P.3d 581 (Or. 2019); State v. Wigg, 889 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt.
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have been able to obtain preemptive relief in the form of judicial
“language orders” prohibiting certain usages. 136 In pre-trial litigation
regarding a sexual assault charge, Kobe Bryant was successful in
obtaining an order excluding the word “victim” at trial, in favor of
“alleged victim” and the woman’s name. 137 The court noted that “the
common understanding of the term ‘victim’ certainly implies that a
person has been the subject of a particular wrong or crime and its use
under these circumstances could improperly suggest that a crime had
been committed such that the presumption of innocence might be
jeopardized.” 138
However, the universe of published opinions—of course, a limited
picture of what occurs in court and even of what happens at trial 139—
reveals many instances of apparent acquiescence to this usage. Defense
arguments for a new trial are frequently denied, even when judicial
orders to avoid this usage have been repeatedly violated, 140 whether by
judges, 141 defense attorneys, 142 prosecutors, 143 witnesses, 144 or some
combination thereof, 145 and even when, in the very act of defining the
governing law by means of jury instructions, judges have identified the
complainant as a “victim.” 146 Courts may recognize that the potential
for prejudice is “obvious,” 147 but they frequently find it to be
unrealized. 148
2005); State v. Devey, 138 P.3d 90, 95 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); State v. McFarland, No. 32873-2-III,
2016 WL 901088, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2016).
136 Note, however, that in several instances these have been violated. See, e.g., Thompson, 76
A.3d at 283.
137 Order Re Motion to Preclude References to the Accuser as the “Victim,” People v. Bryant,
supra note 131.
138 Id. at 2.
139 Thank you to Jocelyn Simonson for highlighting this point. Note that the limitations
involve not just the lack of published record corresponding to the majority of trials, but also the
fact that these concerns exist outside of the trial context, as in bail hearings, for example.
140 See Ivon v. State, No. A-11817, 2017 WL 4334029 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017)
(violation by prosecutor and prosecution witness).
141 State v. Rodriguez, 946 A.2d 294, 302–03 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
142 See, e.g., Grady v. Warden, No. CV144006185S, 2019 WL 1093301 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
28, 2019).
143 See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 76 A.3d 273, 283–85 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (prosecutor
violated judicial order repeatedly, but new trial was denied).
144 See State v. Hills, No. 44496-4-I, 2000 WL 1873922 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2000);
Tollefson v. Stephens, No. SA:14-CV-144-DAE, 2014 WL 7339119, at *18 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 23,
2014) (“[I]t is not error for the State, witnesses, or defense counsel to use the word ‘victim’ at
trial.”).
145 See, e.g., Grady, 2019 WL 1093301 (defense counsel and prosecutor).
146 See, e.g., United States v. Washburn, 444 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006).
147 Grady, 2019 WL 1093301, at *6.
148 See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 574 S.E.2d 700, 703–04 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
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Judges often rule against the defense by drawing distinctions, and
making arguments, that are not just problematic means of resolving
individual cases, but troubling indications of how they view our system.
For example, perhaps the most common distinction drawn by judges
ruling on this issue is a distinction between cases where the defense was
contesting that any crime occurred (as in a self-defense scenario), and
cases where the defense was “not contesting” that a crime occurred—
but rather arguing that the defendant was wrongly accused. 149 Courts
are frequently willing to find error in the first scenario, 150 but not in the
second scenario. 151 After all, the courts reason, if no one is contesting
that a crime occurred, then we do have a victim. 152 This justification
appears frequently, with no indications that it is ever challenged.
However, a challenge is due. When the defense argument is that the
wrong person has been charged, it is not the job of the defense attorney
(and it may well be distracting and unhelpful) to take a stance on
whether a crime occurred. Her “failure to contest” the concept that a
crime occurred should not be used as some sort of “concession” that a
crime occurred. Her job is to develop a defense and pursue it. If the
defense is that the wrong person has been charged it would be a waste
of time and money, and perhaps in derogation of her responsibilities to
her client, to spend time investigating all possible defenses that might
possibly be pursued by some hypothetical other defendant so that she
can say that none applied and that there was indeed a crime. The job of
establishing that a crime occurred is that of the prosecution.
Courts’ treatment of the word “victim” sometimes reveals a
troubling inability fully to comprehend the justificatory nature of selfdefense claims. 153 We see this when they conclude that there is no error
149 See, e.g., NAT’L CRIME VICTIM LAW INST., USE OF THE TERM “VICTIM” IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS (11th ed. 2014), https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/21940-use-of-the-term-victim-incrim-proc11th-edpdf [https://perma.cc/FDN5-FRLK] (endorsing this distinction); Washington
v. State, No. 480, 2008 WL 697591 (Del. Mar. 17, 2008).
150 That error may, however, be found harmless; and indeed courts do not always find this to
be error. See Mason v. State, No. 203, 1997 WL 90780, at *2 (Del. Feb. 25, 1997).
151 See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21, 24 (Del. 1991) (stating that “‘victim’ is used
appropriately during trial when there is no doubt that a crime was committed and simply the
identity of the perpetrator is in issue. We agree with defendant that the word ‘victim’ should not
be used in a case where the commission of a crime is in dispute.”); State v. Cortes, 851 A.2d 1230,
1241 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (“In cases in which the fact that a crime has been committed against
the complaining witness is not contested, but only the identity of the perpetrator is in dispute, a
court’s use of the term ‘victim’ is not inappropriate.”); State v. Weber, 2017 WL 3638209, at *4
(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2017); State v. Austin, 422 P.3d 18, 31 (Haw. 2018).
152 See Jackson, 600 A.2d at 25.
153 See Khalid Ghanayim & Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Reconsidering the Grounds and
the Causing Conditions for the Necessity Defense: Between Justification and Excuse—A
Comprehensive Study, 86 UMKC L. REV. 111, 112 (2017) (“Justifications negate the wrongdoing
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(or no prejudicial error) in calling the person who was wounded or
killed by the defendant a “victim,” given their injuries. It may be
understandable that if someone was hurt or died a court might say of
that person “of course we have a victim.” That sort of thing happens all
the time in common parlance: we talk of “homicide victims,” even if all
we know about the circumstances is that people were killed. 154 But in a
legal context, where justificatory defenses such as self-defense may
apply, it is problematic. So, for example, in cases involving self-defense
claims, courts will sometimes quote the Black’s Law Dictionary
definition of “victim” (someone “harmed by a crime, tort, or other
wrong”) and even after doing so will conclude that the complainant
certainly was a “victim.” 155 Judges are missing something crucial about
self-defense claims, however. 156 In such cases, there may be a dead body,
but under the law there may be no crime, tort, or wrong. 157 This judicial
approach raises questions about the role and value assigned to
justificatory defenses, and to the attorneys tasked with raising them,
within our criminal system. 158

that constitutes the criminality of a particular action, by treating the conduct in question as
societally right and just, as well as consistent with the purposes of criminal law.”).
154 See People v. Allen, No. E065202, 2017 WL 4927712, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2017)
(finding no error).
155 See, e.g., Tran v. Davis, No. 4:17-CV-330-Y, 2018 WL 2193925, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 14,
2018) (citing Victim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A ‘victim’ is ‘[a] person
harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong.’ Thus, reference to Nguyen as the ‘victim’ was accurate.
Nguyen died as the result of gun shot wounds, and Petitioner admitted to shooting him. The only
question was whether Petitioner shot him in self-defense.”); Pridgen v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No.
6:17cv128, 2019 WL 2464769, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2019) (citing Black’s definition, and
concluding that the complainant “was in fact the victim of a fatal shooting,” despite the fact that
the claim was self-defense, in other words a claim that definitions such as that in Black’s were not
satisfied); Sanchez v. State, 253 P.3d 136, 144 (Wyo. 2011) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary
definition in support of assertion that “it was uncontested at trial that AI was the victim of a
vicious beating. The only real dispute concerned whether Sanchez was her assailant and, if so,
whether he was the first aggressor or acted in self-defense.”).
156 See Tran, 2018 WL 2193925, at *8; Pridgen, 2019 WL 2464769, at *10; Sanchez, 253 P.3d at
144; State v. Rodebaugh, 655 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (despite self-defense claim,
stating that “[w]e see no prejudice to defendant in the prosecutor’s reference to the body of a
man dead of a gunshot as a ‘victim’”).
157 See People v. Lovely, No. F071158, 2018 WL 1980960, at *22 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2018)
(quoting defense brief that stated that “[b]eing killed does not necessarily make someone a victim
because [the defendant] could have acted in self-defense (i.e. justifiable homicide)”); Michael
Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1764
(1999) (describing conception of crime as “a part of every human society, possibly a needed part,
a functional mechanism that helps set and then illuminate the boundaries of acceptable
behavior.”).
158 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 1022–25 (suggesting that premature
judgments of guilt help explain failures to provide and support defense counsel).
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The case law also reveals judicial tendencies to defer to law
enforcement. A common ground for rejecting defense arguments about
the word “victim” is that when the word is used by police witnesses it is
just the way that they talk—just “synonymous with the complaining
witness” 159—and that we should not ask police officers to do things
differently. 160 This judicial assertion about synonymity was first made
(without support) in a Delaware case, 161 and numerous cases in
numerous jurisdictions have recycled it, 162 again without support other
than that case, and without discussing the question of whether, even if
it was accurate in one jurisdiction, it might not be accurate elsewhere. 163
Among other problems with this assertion, it appears to ignore the fact
that police officers are trained and instructed on how to testify; 164 we do
not just haul them into court fresh from the beat and then penalize them
when they talk in the only way they know how.
In rejecting defendants’ arguments, courts sometimes reveal a
troubling view that the word “victim” is being used “in a neutral
manner,” 165 as a straightforward way of referring to the complainant. 166
It is problematic if the government’s stance has come to seem the

159 See, e.g., State v. Pierce, No. 0407019516, 2008 WL 282278, at *2 (Del. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2008)
(“Use of the word ‘victim’ in rape trial does not constitute reversible error because to law
enforcement officers the word ‘victim’ is synonymous with the complaining witness.”).
160 See James v. Nevada, No. 57178, 2012 WL 5378147, at *6 (Nev. Oct. 31, 2012) (“[W]e
decline to require law enforcement officers to alter their commonly practiced terms of art.”).
161 Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21 (Del. 1991).
162 See, e.g., State v. Harvey 167 Wash. App. 1026 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Wigg, 889
A.2d 233, 237 (Vt. 2005).
163 Note that in at least one Texas case the same justification was used for the word
“complainant.” Turro v. State, 950 S.W.2d 390, 405 (Tex. App. 1997) (witness “explained to the
jury that he used the term ‘complainant’ simply out of habit because it was the term police officers
commonly used to refer to all victims”); id. at 406 (“[I]t is not only the habit of police officers to
refer to deceased victims as complainants, it is often used in that manner by courts.”). Note also
that the Hawaii Supreme Court has rejected the Delaware pronouncement. See State v. Mundon,
292 P.3d 205, 230 (Haw. 2012) (“Contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court of
Delaware . . . it is not evident that police officers generally use the term ‘victim’ to refer to a
complaining witnesses [sic] in police reports or when otherwise referring to a person making a
complaint against another person.”).
164 See, e.g., David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 455, 500 (1999).
165 See, e.g., Davis v. State, No. 05-18-00398-CR, 2019 WL 2442883, at *2 (Tex. App. June 12,
2019) (stating that “the word ‘victim’ is mild, non-prejudicial, and is commonly used at trial in a
neutral manner to describe the events in question”); Cueva v. Stephens, No. 2:14-CV-417, 2016
WL 4014088, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2016) (same).
166 See Buszkiewic v. State, 424 P.3d 1272, 1279 (Wyo. 2018) (“The prosecutor was simply
referring to Ms. Oakland’s role in the criminal proceedings—she was alleged to be the victim of
two strangulations by Mr. Buszkiewic.”).
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neutral stance. 167 Since it really does not seem to be “neutral” here 168—
“victim,” after all, is the word for someone who has suffered a crime—
perhaps what is meant is something more like “normalized” or “usual.”
That is not really a salve; rather, it suggests still more reason for
concern, if this presumption that a crime occurred has become so
commonplace as to go largely unnoticed. 169
While multiple courts including and since the Williams court in
1860 have been clear on the core risk for defendants—that the word
“victim” could be seen as resolving a crucial jury question 170—others
seem unable to identify the threat correctly. In Texas, a line of precedent
has developed that rejects defense arguments regarding the use of
“victim” on the basis that “more inflammatory” words have failed to
inspire judicial relief: “butcher,” “killer,” “slaughter,” “sex slave,” and so
on. 171 These are not necessarily nice words, but the problem with
“victim” in this context is less that it might inflame the jury, and more
that it might eviscerate the jury’s fact-finding function. This is a
different problem, but not necessarily a “milder” usage than the other
ones that Texas has upheld. 172 As further indication that the Texas
courts sometimes struggle to see the core issue, one court supported its
rejection of an ineffectiveness of counsel claim based on defense
counsel’s pre-adjudication use of the word by saying that “appellate
courts in Texas have even used the word ‘victim’ in writing their
167 See Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 249, 254 (2019) (“To be ‘neutral’ is to side with the prosecution, not the defendant.”).
168 See State v. Price, No. A18-1964, 2019 WL 4254834, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2019)
(noting that the district court’s pre-trial order stated that “[i]f there is an alleged victim, the
attorney for the State shall instruct its witnesses to make all reasonable efforts to use neutral
language and not refer to the alleged victim as ‘victim’”).
169 See State v. Wilson, No. 0012014953, 2006 WL 1064179, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2006)
(mentioning a defense argument that defense counsel’s failure to object could mean that “the
jury became conditioned to thinking of the complaining witnesses as victims”); State v. Wigg,
889 A.2d 233, 236–37 (Vt. 2005) (recommending that witnesses use “a more neutral term” than
“victim”); State v. Sperou, 442 P.3d 581, 590 (Or. 2019) (rejecting the State’s argument that jurors
will understand “that the word ‘victim’ really means ‘alleged victim’”).
170 See People v. Ruiz, No. B278461, 2018 WL 4292027, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2018) (“the
ultimate issue”); State v. Thompson, 76 A.3d 273, 288 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (“the central issue”);
Mahone v. Eden, No. 1:15-cv-01009-PJK-KBM, 2019 WL 2724054, at *1 (D.N.M. June 28, 2019)
(rejecting “victim” usage in light of the “critical threshold finding” presupposed by the definition
of Victim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
171 See, e.g., Anderson v. State, No. 03-00-00074-CR, 2001 WL 660931, at *4 (Tex. App. June
14, 2001) (“‘Victim’ is quite mild compared to other terms used by prosecutors in their comments
to the jury, which the courts have found non-prejudicial.”) (citing cases in which claims of
prejudice were rejected as regards the following terms: “slaughter,” “this killer,” “sex slave,” and
“butcher”); Brown v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 6:07cv272, 2008 WL 1998691, at *6, *11 (E.D.
Tex. May 2, 2008).
172 See, e.g., Anderson, 2001 WL 660931, at *4.
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opinions.” 173 The court’s citation was to a case upholding a conviction:
in other words, a case in which the procedural posture did not implicate
the relevant concern. 174
No doubt some of these usages are more troubling than others, and
on the more problematic end of the spectrum lie jury instructions. The
use of the word “victim” in these instructions—distillations of the law
that need to be constructed with care—is particularly concerning
because of its potential consequences, because appellate courts often
endorse it, and because it suggests how deeply embedded it is in legal
thought. One might assume that courts would take these usages
particularly seriously, since if one trusts the jury’s common sense—as
courts in this area urge us to do 175—the jury must know that these are
not casual or offhand references. But here, judges are frequently able to
reject defense arguments precisely because judges are laying out
considered bodies of law. 176 A number of courts have taken the position
that if a judge’s instructions parrot the language of a statute, that judge
is likely to be in a safe harbor vis-à-vis reversal. 177 (Other cases take the
same position with regard to judges who are using pattern
instructions). 178 That justification is problematic. A criminal statute, of
course, defines a crime. It may well be unobjectionable (at least as
regards this Article’s focus) to use “victim” in saying what a crime is,
because if we have a crime under the statute in question we can say that
we have a victim. 179 But to lift a statute into a jury instruction in a way
that applies the language of “victim” to the complaining witness is to
risk endorsing a premature determination of criminal victimhood, and
potentially of guilt.

Cueva v. State, 339 S.W.3d 839, 864 (Tex. App. 2011).
But see infra Section III.C.
175 See, e.g., Ruiz, 2018 WL 4292027, at *3.
176 See State v. Walston, 766 S.E.2d 312, 319 (N.C. 2014) (stating that “we have often approved
of jury instructions that are consistent with the pattern instructions” and that “[t]he term ‘victim’
appears frequently in our state’s pattern jury instructions”).
177 See Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Because the jury charge
tracked the language of the statute, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by including the
word ‘victim’ in the charge.”); Server v. Mizell, 902 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1990) (“No logical
argument can be made that the mere use of the term ‘victim’ somehow shifted the burden of
proof. The word ‘victim’ was taken directly from the language of the statute, which used the term
because it is gender neutral.”); Hernandez v. State, 340 S.W.3d 55, 61 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (“As
a general proposition, a jury charge that tracks the language of the relevant statute is sufficient
and therefore not erroneous.”).
178 See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 688 S.E.2d 766, 769 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Lopez, No.
COA11-722, 2012 WL 2308555, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. June 19, 2012); State v. Walker, No. 06-0259,
2007 WL 1828321, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 27, 2007).
179 But see infra Section III.C.
173
174
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Consider, for example, a recent North Carolina Supreme Court
case involving jury instructions. 180 The defendant had requested that
the words “alleged victim” instead of “victim” be used. 181 That request
was denied, and the pattern jury instructions were read to the jury. 182
Those pattern jury instructions repeatedly required the jury to
determine whether certain facts were true about “the victim,” 183 thus
assigning to the complaining witness the term “victim” even in the
context of asking the jurors to decide whether the alleged crimes had
been committed. So, for example, the jurors were to assess whether the
following things had been established beyond a reasonable doubt:
“First, that the defendant engaged in a sexual act with the
victim. . . . Second, that at the time of the acts alleged the victim was a
child under the age of 13. And third, that at the time of the alleged
offense the defendant was at least 12 years old and was at least four years
older than the victim.” 184 The Court of Appeals had found that the trial
court erred in refusing the request to use “alleged victim”—it reasoned
that whether the complaining witness was victimized “was “a disputed
issue of fact for the jury to resolve” 185—but the state Supreme Court
reversed. 186 After all, it said, the trial court was sticking largely with the
pattern jury instructions, and pattern jury instructions are surely a safe
harbor against reversal. 187
Even when courts are persuaded that the use of “victim” was error,
the obstacles to relief frequently mean that nothing changes. It is
common for courts in this area to find that the defendant has failed to
meet his or her burden—each phrased in terms more forbidding than
the last 188—of showing that the error was prejudicial, and thus has failed

Walston, 766 S.E.2d 312.
See id. at 314.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 317–18.
184 Id. at 317. The instructions have now been amended to refer to “alleged victim.” See infra
Part III.
185 Walston, 766 S.E.2d, at 314–15.
186 Id. at 314.
187 Id. at 319 (suggesting limited circumstances in which “alleged victim” would be
preferable).
188 See, e.g., State v. Ivey, No. COA17-1266, 2018 WL 3431870, at *3–4 (N.C. Ct. App. July 16,
2018) (harmless error because “victim” references “cannot be said to have substantially altered
the way the jury viewed the evidence,” the defendant cannot show that they “rendered it
impossible for him to receive a fair and impartial verdict,” and the defendant cannot
“demonstrate substantial and irreparable prejudice”); People v. Broglin, No. 274342, 2008 WL
508108, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2008) (“[R]eversal is not required unless defendant meets
his burden of establishing that the error was outcome-determinative and most likely resulted in
a miscarriage of justice.”).
180
181
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to win a new trial. 189 And indeed, these cases make one wonder, as
harmless error standards often do, 190 how one could ever meet such a
standard: 191 how could one plausibly show that the word “victim,” even
when repeated multiple times by multiple parties, had the kind of
influence that these standards demand? 192 Moreover, to defeat defense
claims, judges have an almost fail-safe form of harmless error argument
to deploy. 193 If jury instructions were given that laid out the correct
standards as regards the phenomena that this usage implicates—the
presumption of innocence, 194 the burden of proof, 195 the jury’s role, 196
the judge’s role, 197 the need for the jury to be unbiased, 198 the fact that
opening statements and arguments are not evidence, 199 and so on—
then, regardless of social science findings to the contrary, 200 courts are

189 See Tolen v. State, No. A-10159, 2012 WL 104477, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012)
(“In general, courts have only found reversible error where the term was used multiple times
and/or was coupled with other prejudicial error or misconduct.”).
190 See Justin Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1791, 1793 (2017).
191 See, e.g., State v. Weber, No. 0408022175, 2017 WL 3638209, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22,
2017) (“Defendant has not set forth a sufficient showing that but for the use of the term, the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”).
192 See State v. Harvey, No. 29513-3-III, 2012 WL 1071234, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 29,
2012) (“Ultimately, we do not know and cannot know what effect, if any, the reference by police
or first responders to the deceased as ‘victims’ had.”).
193 Note that Cortes is a rare exception (finding reversible error, despite state’s argument that
other instructions negated the prejudicial effect). See State v. Cortes, 851 A.2d 1230, 1239–41
(Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
194 See Tolen, 2012 WL 104477, at *4.
195 See id.
196 See id.; State v. Vilchel, 963 A.2d 658, 674 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (quoting the trial judge
as having said to the jury, after self-defense instructions that referred to the complainant as the
“victim,” “If I used the word victim, and I think it’s specifically like in reference to [the
complainant], that doesn’t mean I see him as a victim or anything like that. That’s for you to
decide, okay?”); id. at 675 (“The court unambiguously eliminated any improper connotation that
the jury could infer from the court’s use of the term by reminding the jury that it was the finder
of fact and that the court did not view [the complainant] to be the victim of any crime.”).
197 See State v. Brown, 984 A.2d 86, 96 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
198 See People v. Lovely, No. F071158, 2018 WL 1980960, at *25 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2018).
199 See People v. Cannon, No. H033457, 2009 WL 2416050, at *18 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2009);
Lovely, 2018 WL 1980960, at *25.
200 See, e.g., Vida B. Johnson, Presumed Fair? Voir Dire on the Fundamentals of Our Criminal
Justice System, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 545, 557 (2015) (discussing the misguided confidence in
instructions that include those addressing the presumption of innocence and the prosecutor’s
burden of proof).
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to presume that those instructions were followed, 201 and that they
proved curative. 202
The difficulty of persuading judges that defendants suffered
prejudice presents a huge obstacle to ineffectiveness of counsel claims,
whether the claims are based on defense counsel’s failure to object to
this usage, or defense counsel’s adoption of this usage, or both. Many
such claims fail at the first of the two steps required under Supreme
Court case Strickland (that is, showing deficient representation); 203
almost all fail at the second step (that is, showing resultant prejudice). 204
A rare—perhaps unique—example of defense success came in the Ohio
case State v. Almedom. 205 The appellate court found prejudicial error
where defense counsel had remained silent in the face of repeated
judicial descriptions of the complaining witnesses as “victims,” some of
which occurred before any testimony began. 206 This case, as do many
presenting this issue, involved horrible alleged facts. 207 Whereas for
some courts these alleged facts seem to act as a reason to reject defense
claims, 208 for this court they highlighted the importance of a trial in
which guilt was not, and did not appear to be, predetermined. The court
explained its reasoning as follows:
The average person is disgusted by the idea of anyone sexually
abusing young children. Sefe Almedom was portrayed as such a
disgusting person long before any evidence was presented. The trial
court judge, who is viewed as the ultimate authority figure in the
courtroom, in essence told the jury more than once that Almedom
201 See Lovely, 2018 WL 1980960, at *26; State v. Holmes, No. COA12–1580, 2013 WL
5477371, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2013).
202 See Tolen v. State, No. A-10159, 2012 WL 104477, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012);
Alto v. State, No. A-10883, 2013 WL 1558157, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2013); State v.
Rodriguez, 946 A.2d 294, 302–03 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008); State v. Nomura, 903 P.2d 718, 722–23
(Haw. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Mundon, No. CAAP-10-0000101, 2012 WL 1473433, at *4 (Haw.
Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2012); State v. Branco, No. 24281, 2002 WL 31781118, at *1 (Haw. Ct. App.
Dec. 12, 2002).
203 See, e.g., Anderson v. State, No. 03-00-00074-CR, 2001 WL 660931, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App.
June 14, 2001); People v. Sanchez, 256 Cal. Rptr. 446, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). A rare exception
is Grady v. Warden, No. CV144006185S, 2019 WL 1093301, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2019).
204 See State v. Wilson, No. 0012014953, 2006 WL 1064179, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2006);
Grady, 2019 WL 1093301.
205 State v. Almedom, No. 15AP-852, 2016 WL 1461839 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2016).
206 Id. at *1 (“For reasons that are not clear, defense counsel never objected to the trial judge’s
comments even though the references began before any witnesses had testified. For instance, in
describing the case before the testimony began, the judge stated, ‘It is my understanding that in
this case all victims are under the age of 13.’”).
207 See Erin P. Davenport, Idealized into Powerlessness: How a Judicial Order in Nebraska v.
Safi Could Send Women’s Rights Back to Colonial America, 12 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 15
(2008).
208 See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 742 S.E.2d 338, 342 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
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had victimized three young girls. Almedom’s claims that the
accusations flowed from the hatred of the girls’ mother toward him
following the end of his emotional relationship with her could not be
fairly and impartially evaluated by the jury after the jury had been
told repeatedly by the trial court judge that the girls were victims. All
the while, Almedom’s defense counsel, who was supposed to be
advocating for Almedom’s well-being, stood idly by and made no
objection to the trial judge’s accusation that his client was a child
abuser. The case was essentially decided before the first words were
uttered by the witnesses for the State of Ohio and long before
Almedom had a chance to deny the accusations and to submit a
theory as to why the accusations were being made.
We are not saying that the girls are not being truthful. We are not
saying that Almedom was being truthful. We are saying that the
conduct of the trial judge when linked with the deficient conduct of
defense counsel denied Almedom of the opportunity for a fair trial—
a trial in which his defense could be fairly considered. 209

This intermediate court encapsulated in two short paragraphs
many of the key concerns surrounding this issue: the risk of judgments
or assumptions of guilt that precede and moot the evidence; 210 the
pressing need for a fair trial even (or especially) in the face of awful
alleged facts; the particular horror of a situation in which the judge
(symbol of fairness) puts her imprimatur on a prosecution narrative;
the particular horror of a situation in which defense counsel (symbol of
protection) acquiesces thereto; the ever-present fear that to urge caution
about the premature use of the word “victim” will be understood not as
defending the constitutional system but as attacking the truthfulness of
those alleging harm; 211 and the fragility of defenses in a regime that is
inclined to endorse the prosecutorial account. 212
Thus, one sees in this litigation just how firmly ground into our
law and legal thinking the merger of “victim” and “alleged victim” is. It
is there in many jury instructions. 213 It is there in the words of the
Almedom, 2016 WL 1461839, at *2–3.
See Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867 (2018).
211 See Scott A. McDonald, When a Victim’s a Victim: Making Reference to Victims and SexCrime Prosecution, 6 NEV. L.J. 248, 269 (2005).
212 For other aspects of this problem, see Brandon L. Garrett, Why Plea Bargains Are Not
Confessions, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1415, 1421 (2016) (“Judges may ask a defendant to provide
an ‘allocution’ before pleading guilty, but the admission of guilt need not be under oath or very
detailed, and it may just involve an in-court agreement that the defendant committed acts
satisfying the legal elements of the crime.”); id. at 1427 (“An admission to having satisfied the
elements of the crime . . . does not reach the question of whether any defenses might defeat
criminal liability.”).
213 See People v. Lovely, No. F071158, 2018 WL 1980960, at *25 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2018).
209
210
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prosecutor, and the court, and defense counsel 214—even when orders
banning its use have been issued. Judges often say their use was
inadvertent, 215 as do defense attorneys, 216 and in one instance, after
violating judicial orders again and again, the prosecutor said she just
could not help herself. 217 She could not understand her reflexive
repetition of this word. 218
II.

WHERE MIGHT THIS USAGE LEAD?

Part I demonstrated that the use of “victim” in the preadjudication context, and thus an apparent willingness to treat an
accusation as a crime, is widespread. It explained that in the litigation
context courts often conclude that even if the pre-adjudication use of
the word “victim” is error, the error is harmless; that this is just
“semantics,” 219 as if the law was not created by language. 220 In this Part,
I resist this acceptance, analyzing concerns that may be exacerbated by
this widespread usage, and by the acquiescence with which it is often
met.
A.

A Paltry Substitute

“Victims’ rights” provisions often cite the values of respect and
dignity, 221 and since one needs to fall within the “victim” category to be
214 See Grady v. Warden, No. CV144006185S, 2019 WL 1093301, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
28, 2019).
215 See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 946 A.2d 294, 302–03 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
216 See, e.g., Grady, 2019 WL 1093301, at *7; Cano v. State, No. 14-06-00377-CR, 2007 WL
2872418, at *8 (Tex. App. Oct. 4, 2007) (stating that trial counsel’s references to the complainant
as the “victim” were “slips of the tongue” and “inconsistent with the defense that the complainant
was untruthful and no crime occurred”).
217 See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 76 A.3d 273, 283–84 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (describing several
judicial instructions to the prosecutor not to use “victim,” and several violations of those
instructions).
218 Id. at 284 (quoting prosecutor as saying “I don’t know why I keep doing that. . . . I—it’s
inadvertent, I’m not doing it intentionally”); id. at 288 (describing the usage as “almost
reflexive”).
219 See, e.g., Agee v. State, 544 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1989) (“To say that the use of [‘victim’]
as opposed to [‘decedent’] would conjure up prejudice against appellant in the minds of the jurors
is indeed to stretch a point based upon semantics.”).
220 See Alice Ristroph, The Curriculum of the Carceral State, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1631, 1696
(“As a human practice, law relies heavily upon human language.”).
221 See Deborah M. Weissman, The Community Politics of Domestic Violence, 82 BROOK. L.
REV. 1479, 1495 (2017); Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing,
Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 261–63.
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able to claim those rights, the word “victim” itself has been interpreted
as having the potential to offer respect and dignity. 222 As mentioned
above, 223 it is a multi-layered word that, in addition to its legal meaning,
can all at one time express that a person needs help, 224 deserves
protection, 225 is telling the truth (in contrast to a defendant who is
not), 226 is accurate, 227 and is in the right (in contrast to the defendant
“victimizer,” who is in the wrong, and is indeed a bad person). 228 Some
or all of these layers of meaning may make the word desirable, 229
particularly when seen in the context of the multiple people—
particularly women, 230 particularly people of color 231—whose accounts
of harms and crimes have in many instances been devalued, distrusted,
and challenged; whose champions have in many instances been
absent. 232
Thus in one recent Arizona case, a complaining witness sued the
presiding judge after he denied her request to preclude reference to her
as the “alleged victim.” 233 She argued that “because the [state] Victims’
Bill of Rights only uses the term ‘victim’ to refer to the crime victim,
there is an implicit right to be referred to as such throughout the
proceedings.” 234 She noted that the Arizona State Constitution states
that every victim in Arizona has the right to be treated throughout the
criminal justice process with “fairness, respect, and dignity,” 235 and
argued that “alleged victim” violates that right “because it calls into
See Z.W. v. Foster, 422 P.3d 582, 583 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
See supra Part I.
224 See Simon, supra note 38, at 1112.
225 See id.
226 See Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 437–38 (2004) (“The
veracity of the victim, and by negative implication the dishonesty of the defendant, is . . . assumed
prima facie.”); id. at 437 n.18 (mentioning jury instructions to view defendant testimony with
skepticism); Veteto v. State, 8 S.W.3d 805, 816 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (“Referring to A.L. as the
victim instead of the alleged victim lends credence to her testimony that the assaults occurred
and that she was, indeed, a victim.”).
227 See id.
228 See Gruber, supra note 226, at 435; Minow, supra note 43, at 1433.
229 Though note that many reject the label “victim.” See infra Section III.A.3.
230 See Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on
Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 655 n.43 (2003).
231 See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1271 (1991) (noting that “Black women
are essentially prepackaged as bad women within cultural narratives about good women who can
be raped and bad women who cannot”).
232 See id.
233 See Z.W. v. Foster, 422 P.3d 582, 583 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
234 Id. at 583.
235 Id. (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art 2, § 2.1).
222
223
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question whether a crime was committed and whether someone is in
fact a victim.” 236 The court rejected her demand, finding that in the preadjudication setting “alleged victim” is accurate, given that “the case
involves an alleged criminal act against an alleged victim.” 237 (The court
declined to comment on the tension between this accurate statement
and the “victim” language used pre-adjudication by the state’s
constitution and statutes. 238) However, the court went on to disclaim
the notion that the term “alleged victim” is always appropriate, and to
leave open the possibility that it might in certain cases “undermin[e] the
victim’s right to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity.” 239
One may wonder whether the word “victim” and the associated
legal entitlements are paltry substitutes for more meaningful sources of
respect and dignity. Many scholars have noted that legal entitlements
offered to “victims” ostensibly to aid them are limited in the extent to
which they help, given that they may be motivated less by true
understanding of, or interest in, the needs of those claiming harm, 240
and more by the interests of the state. 241 An examination, for example,
of the type of “victim” who is eligible for state compensation reveals that
it is frequently the “innocent” and compliant: bars to compensation for
“victims” include the fact that they had a particular type of criminal
record, 242 or were incarcerated or “engaged in an illegal act” at the time
Id.
Id.
238 Note the Arizona definition of “victim” mentioned supra Section I.A (“‘Victim’ means a
person against whom the criminal offense has been committed.”).
239 Foster, 422 P.3d at 584.
240 See Meaghan Ybos, The Media Frenzy Over Chanel Miller Boosts Mass Incarceration, THE
APPEAL (Sept. 30, 2019), https://theappeal.org/chanel-miller-brock-turner [https://perma.cc/
CH3Q-WCB9] (“[V]ictims are often survivors of a criminal legal system that is just as cruel and
punishing to them as it is to criminal defendants.”); Allegra McLeod, Envisioning Abolition
Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1638 (2019) (critiquing criminal prosecution as regards “the
needs of survivors of harm”); Brittany Hailer, Help or Hinderance: Is PA’s Marsy’s Law Too
Ambiguous to Help All Victims?, PITTSBURGH CURRENT (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.pittsburghcurrent.com/pa-marsys-law-too-ambiguous-to-help-all-victims
[https://perma.cc/N4R6-PE5B] (discussing possibility that provisions of Marsy’s Law, such as
repeated contact, notification, and requests to attend court, may re-traumatize).
241 See Weissman, supra note 221, at 1492; MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE
GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 77 (2006) (“Victims became a
powerful weapon in the arsenal of proponents of the law-and-order agenda.”).
242 See ALA. CODE § 15-23-23 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-712(a)(5) (2020); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-41-17(1)(j) (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-106(c) (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 539-125(6) (2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(E)(1) (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-7-510
(2020); Alysia Santo, The Victims Who Don’t Count, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 13, 2018, 7:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/09/13/the-victims-who-don-t-count
[https://perma.cc/E6EW-69RD] (pointing out that seven states “bar people with a criminal
record from receiving victim compensation,” and drawing on records from two states to show
236
237
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of the alleged crime, 243 or were not up to date with financial
obligations, 244 or in compliance with vehicle insurance laws, 245 or that
they did not report the alleged crime swiftly enough, 246 or did not
cooperate with the authorities in its prosecution. 247 Respect and dignity,
if in fact they are offered, are offered partially and with conditions. 248
Indeed, some states make their motivations plain, acknowledging that
they are offering what they offer to “victims” in order to facilitate their

that “the bans fall hardest on black victims and their families”); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-2519(d)(1)(ii), (iii); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.060(4) (2020); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28
(California’s Marsy’s Law definition of “victim” excludes those “in custody for an offense”).
243 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1510 (1976); ALA. CODE § 15-23-60(19) (1975); ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-23.4-03; OR. REV. STAT. § 147.105(6);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(E)(1) (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25-19(d)(2) (2020); TEX. art.
§ 56B.057(b)(6); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-7-510(1)(h) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.68.060(2)(b), (c) (2020); W.VA. CODE § 14-2A-14(e) (2020).
244 See OR. REV. STAT. § 147.105(6) (ordinarily no compensation for “a victim who owes a
financial obligation ordered or imposed as a result of a previous criminal conviction”); WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.68.060(4)(b) (2020).
245 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-7-510 (2020) (no reparations for “the victim of a motor
vehicle injury who was the owner or operator of the motor vehicle and was not at the time of the
injury in compliance with the state motor vehicle insurance laws”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-23.401(8) (same).
246 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9010(a)(5) (seventy-two hours); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-3
(1956); TEX. art. § 56B.053(a) (2021) (“not so late as to interfere with or hamper the investigation
and prosecution”); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.060(b) (2020).
247 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25-19(d)(1)(i) (1956); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-3 (2020); ALA.
CODE § 15-23-12(c) (1975); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 13956 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-208(c);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11 § 9010(a)(3) (2011); FLA. STAT. § 960.13(1)(b) (2019); IND. CODE § 5-26.1-18; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7305 (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.370(2) (2020); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 46:1809(3)(a)(ii) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258C, § 2(c) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 18.356(2) (2020); MINN. STAT. § 611A.53(2)(2); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-41-17(3); MO. REV.
STAT. § 595.020(4) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-125(4); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.220(1)(e)
(2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-7(D)(3); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11(c) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 54-23.4-06(5); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(C) (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.015(1)(d); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 11.707(a)(4) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1170(4) (2017); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-28B-25(c) (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-109(f) (2012) (“fully cooperates”);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. § 56B.107(a)(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-7-509(e); W.VA. CODE
§ 14-2A-14(d) (2020); Santo, supra note 242 (adding that most funds “deny reimbursement to
victims who refuse to cooperate with law enforcement or who were committing a crime that
contributed to their injury or death”); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.060(3) (2020); WIS. STAT.
§ 949.08(2)(d) (2016); WYO. STAT. § 1-40-106(a)(iv).
248 See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 623 (2009).
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assistance with prosecution, 249 and sometimes even asserting a “duty”
on the part of “victims” to provide that assistance. 250
Thus, the expansion of this kind of “victim” usage and of the rights
attached thereto brings troubling consequences for both those charged
with crime and those who have suffered from crime. Defendants are in
danger, not only because of all the ways in which this language usage
might further condition us to assume criminal wrongdoing, 251 but also
because many of the new rights offered to complainants—to resist
discovery, 252 to be present at all proceedings, 253 to weigh in on bail and
on pleas, 254 and so on—have the potential to detract from the
protections offered to defendants pre-adjudication. 255 At the same time,
more and more weight may be placed on the term and the associated
rights as sources and indications of “respect” and “dignity,” even
249 See, e.g., TEX. STAT. art. § 56B.002(b) (2020) (“It is the legislature’s intent that the
compensation of innocent victims of violent crime encourage greater public cooperation in the
successful apprehension and prosecution of criminals.”); State v. Blake, 63 P.3d 56, 60 (Utah
2002) (stating that the Utah “victims’ rights” amendment was enacted in response to an
increasing recognition that “[w]ithout the cooperation of victims and witnesses in reporting and
testifying about crime, it is impossible in a free society to hold criminals accountable”); WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 35 (“Effective law enforcement depends on cooperation from victims of crime.”);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 801D-1 (mentioning “the continuing importance of . . . citizen cooperation
to state and local law enforcement efforts and the general effectiveness and well-being of the
criminal justice system”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-35 (“improved treatment” of “victims” is to
be achieved through “the establishment of specific rights” with the aim of “enhanc[ing] and
protect[ing] the necessary role of crime victims”).
250 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-1; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.69.010; HAW. REV. STAT. § 801D-1; LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:1841; 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 11.102(1); WIS. STAT. § 950.01 (2020).
251 See State v. Wilson, No. 0012014953, 2006 WL 1064179, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006)
(“Wilson contends that prejudice occurred as the jury became conditioned to thinking of the
complaining witnesses as victims.”).
252 See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(5) (offering the right “[t]o refuse an interview, deposition,
or other discovery request by the defendant”); Arizona ex rel Romley v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d
445 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (in pre-adjudication context, owner of car allegedly struck by defendant
was a “victim” under state constitutional and statutory law, and thus was entitled to refuse a pretrial defense interview); Romley v. Hutt, 987 P.2d 218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (vacating trial court’s
ordering of a “pretrial victim interview,” which had been based on a sense that “[w]here the two
rights are in conflict the defendant’s right to due process must be paramount”).
253 State v. Gertsch, 49 P.3d 392, 400 (Idaho 2002) (stating that Gertsch’s argument that
witnesses should have been excluded “runs contrary to those victims’ constitutional right to be
present at Gertsch’s trial”).
254 See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.
255 See Gruber, supra note 230, at 666 (“Critics contend that the victims’ rights movement in
fact focuses more on increasing punishment than on empowering victims. . . Under this view,
the victims’ rights movement is more of an anti-crime, even anti-defendant movement, than a
movement intended solely to give victims of crime more participation in the criminal process.
As a result, the calls for the granting of party or near-party status are a means to empowering the
victim only when the victim’s interests are adverse to the defendant’s.”).
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though those who have suffered from crime might be better supported
by other means of honoring those values.
B.

Claims Being Treated like Crimes

One way of understanding many of these usages is that they treat
claims as equivalent to crimes. 256 This Subpart will analyze some of the
dangers attending this kind of treatment, starting with law enforcement
claims, then looking at complaining witness claims, and then
considering dangers that exist in both contexts.
1.

Law Enforcement Claims

One thing that appears to be happening in many of these usages is
that law enforcement claims that we have a crime, and thus that we have
a “victim,” are being treated as sufficient to establish that there was a
crime, and thus a “victim.” 257 Some states, for example, are explicit that
a “victim” is someone whom the government says is a “victim.” 258
Oregon voters recently approved a constitutional amendment that
defines “victim” as anyone “determined by the prosecuting attorney or
the court to have suffered direct financial, psychological or physical
harm as a result of a crime.” 259 This is a definition that risks erasing the
defense side of our two-sided adversary system, 260 and that seems to
have inspired a little embarrassment among the state’s judiciary. In a
recent opinion, one appellate judge airbrushed away the problematic
part of that definition (willing even to sacrifice syntax to do it), stating
that “‘[v]ictim’ means any person . . . to have suffered direct financial,
psychological or physical harm as a result of a crime . . . .” 261

256 See id. at 648 n.14 (reproducing Arizona’s “victims’ rights” constitutional provision, and
noting that “[a]lthough the ‘rights’ listed above are all conferred at the pre-trial or trial stage, the
Arizona Constitution’s treatment of the victim assumes occurrence of a criminal offense and
proper identification of the victim”).
257 See People v. Solano, No. B222622, 2011 WL 1833375, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2011).
258 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.01(H) (for purpose of statutory “victims’ rights,”
“victim” is “[a] person who is identified as the victim of a crime . . . in a police report or in a
complaint, indictment, or information”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9401(7) (2020).
259 OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(6)(c) (providing, among other things, pre-adjudication rights to
“victims”).
260 See Davenport, supra note 207, at 24.
261 State v. Horton, 418 P.3d 31, 36 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (Allen, J., dissenting) (second and
third alterations in original) (quoting, selectively, OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(6)(c)).
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Some might say that the treatment of law enforcement claims as
constituting crimes is realistic, 262 but it is problematic. 263 First, it can
contribute to the dominance of law enforcement vocabulary in legal and
other contexts, 264 and thus, as will be discussed below, 265 can contribute
to the dominance of law enforcement framing. Second, it contributes to
an assumption of law enforcement truthfulness and accuracy. 266 This
assumption is fueled by the common presentation of law enforcement
accounts as definitive, 267 but conflicts with both our adversary system
and documented instances of law enforcement dishonesty. 268
2.

Complaining Witness Claims

These usages also reveal examples of the treatment of claims by
complaining witnesses as sufficient to establish crimes. Every state has
“victim compensation” funds, 269 and they frequently allow claims even

See infra Section IV.D.
See Roberts, supra note 22, at 997–1012 (identifying tendencies in the language of judges
and legal scholars, among others, to merge law enforcement accounts with crime commission).
264 See supra Section I.B for instances of prosecutors using the word “victim” in their
indictments and in the courtroom, and courts claiming that “victim” is cop-speak for
“complaining witness.”; see also Adam H. Johnson, Media Frame: Stoking Panic Over “Flood” of
“Juveniles” in Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, THE APPEAL (June 7, 2019), https://theappeal.org/mediaframe-baltimore-inner-harbor-stoking-panic-flood-of-juveniles [https://perma.cc/FF45-5MJM]
(“Baltimore media repeatedly ran headlines . . . referring to children as ‘juveniles,’ a loaded police
term, or ‘Copspeak’ designed to dehumanize those we would normally call teenagers or kids.”);
Donna Coker, sujatha baliga, Alisa Bierria & Mimi Kim, Harms of Criminalization and Promising
Alternatives, 5 U. MIA. RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 369, 381 (2015) (noting choice not to use
“language of law enforcement,” including words like “perps, perpetrators, [and] offenders”).
265 See infra Section IV.C.
266 See Helen A. Anderson, Police Stories, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 29 (2016) (describing
how law enforcement accounts are often presented as if they can be assumed to be truthful and
accurate).
267 See, e.g., Andrew McCormick, Shifting How Journalists Talk About People in Prison,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/language-prisonersholiday-meal-incarceration.php [https://perma.cc/8XCY-9SAZ] (describing this phenomenon).
268 See Roberts, supra note 22, at 997–1012 (identifying tendencies to merge law enforcement
accounts with crime commission in the language of judges and legal scholars, among others); id.
at 993 (mentioning examples of prosecutor and police dishonesty); Paul Farhi & Elahe Izadi,
Journalists Are Reexamining Their Reliance on a Longtime Source: The Police, WASH. POST (June
30, 2020, 11:49 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/journalists-arereexamining-their-reliance-on-a-longtime-source-the-police/2020/06/30/303c929c-b63a-11eaa510-55bf26485c93_story.html [https://perma.cc/5N6L-WGPT].
269 Vida B. Johnson, When the Government Holds the Purse Strings but Not the Purse: Brady,
Giglio, and Crime Victim Compensation Funds, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 491, 492
(2014).
262
263
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in the absence of any arrest or prosecution. 270 “Victims” can declare
themselves to be such, 271 even when “victim” is defined to mean
someone who has suffered a crime. 272 In some “victims’ rights”
provisions, the rights become available “at the time of [the]
victimization,” 273 as opposed to the point at which law enforcement has
intervened to assert the claim itself. 274
As mentioned above, 275 one needs of course to understand the
context that helped to permit the development of “victims’ rights,” a
context that included—and still includes—a tendency to disbelieve
certain kinds of claims from certain groups of people. 276 The call to
#BelieveWomen, for example, stands in contrast to historical and
current tendencies to do the opposite. 277
It is problematic, however, to move from acknowledging our
history of discrediting of claims by women and other subordinated
groups to a stance that a complaining witness’s claim establishes a
crime. 278 To analyze this further, it may be helpful to isolate the
particular component parts of such a stance. To identify a claim with a
270 See ALA. CODE § 15-23-13 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 18.356(2) (2020); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 81-1816(2) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-h(III) (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-10
(2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-7(D) (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-14(a) (2020); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2743.59(A) (2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.11 (2020); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 147.125(1)(a) (2019); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 11.704(b)(2) (2020); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 12-25-19(f) (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28B-23 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13109(f) (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-7-509(2) (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.6(C) (2020);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-110(c) (2020).
271 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:1804 (2020) (“A person who believes he is a victim of a crime
enumerated in R.S. 46:1805 . . . shall be eligible for an award of reparations . . . .”).
272 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:1802 (2020). When these statutes mention a burden of proof,
it is typically a mere “preponderance.” See N.D. CENT. CODE, § 54-23.4-02 (2019); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 11.707(a) (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28B-9 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13109(a); TEX. CODE ANN. 56B.103(a) (2021); 13 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5355(a) (2019).
273 See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 25 (noting that “all victims shall be entitled to the following rights,
beginning at the time of their victimization . . . .”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (same).
274 McDonald, supra note 211, at 256 (“[G]enerally, a crime victim’s rights accrue
independent of the facts of the alleged crime, including any defense asserted, or the conviction
of the defendant.”).
275 See supra Section II.A.
276 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, #BelieveWomen and the Presumption of Innocence, in LXIV
NOMOS: TRUTH AND EVIDENCE (forthcoming Fall 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3592545.
277 See id. (discussing various ways to interpret this demand).
278 Note that this is not necessarily the view of all who endorse the #BelieveWomen stance.
See, e.g., Sherry Colb, What Does #BelieveWomen Mean?, VERDICT (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://verdict.justia.com/2018/11/07/what-does-believewomen-mean [https://perma.cc/5LP6BFCR] (“#BelieveWomen tells us that we can . . . drop the skepticism that we have brought to
rape accusations for centuries.”); id. (“No one with any sense would deny that women have
sometimes lied about rape.”).
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crime is a) to assume the claim’s truthfulness; 279 b) to assume its
accuracy; and c) to assume that the law and facts align in such a way
that a crime, as defined by the law, can be said to have occurred. Much
of the debate in this area focuses on a). 280 Those who support the broad
use of the term “victim,” and oppose attempts to restrict it, often argue
in terms of credibility: they want the term as an affirmation of
truthfulness, and they characterize resistance to the term as an attack
on truthfulness. 281 Presumably people of all sorts sometimes lie, 282 and
are sometimes inaccurate, but let us assume the opposite: let us assume
that all complaining witnesses are truthful and accurately describe their
experience. The much bigger issue—one that goes largely
unacknowledged in this context, and whose disregard threatens core
structures of criminal law—is c). The accounts of complaining
witnesses, even if assumed to be truthful and accurate, may not track
the relevant elements, and defeat any relevant defenses, in a way that
corresponds to a crime as defined by law. 283 This will be discussed
further below. 284
3.

Claims of Either Sort

To treat pre-adjudication claims of crime, whether made by law
enforcement or by complainants, as equivalent to crime, is—among
other issues—to permit one side’s account to become the full story. To
assume the truthfulness of a claim may well translate into assumptions
of untruthfulness of the person facing criminal accusations. 285 But, as
279 See Gruber, supra note 230, at 649–50 (stating that the problem with the trend toward the
“privatization” of the criminal law is that it “assumes the victim . . . is an incontrovertibly
truthful, moral, and irreproachable entity”).
280 See People v. Cannon, No. H033457, 2009 WL 2416050, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2009)
(“Defendant asserted that whether F. was a victim in the case against Allen depended on whether
her testimony at Allen’s trial was truthful.”); McDonald, supra note 211, at 270 (stating that the
word “victim” “preserves the victim-witness’s presumption of veracity”).
281 See McDonald, supra note 211, at 250.
282 See Colb, supra note 278 (discussing those who claim to have been raped).
283 See Minow, supra note 43, at 1434 (“There is a strong tendency for people to couple a claim
of victimhood with a claim of incorrigibility—that the victim knows better than anyone else
about the victimization, and indeed, the victim cannot be wrong about it.”); id. at 1439
(“Systematically disregarding the stories of particular kinds of victims has been so longstanding
a problem that it may seem premature to criticize those occasions when victims do gain an
uncritical hearing. But uncritical deference to the victim’s perspective simply supplants one faulty
view of knowledge and persuasion with another . . . .”).
284 See infra Section II.B.3.
285 See State v. Almedom, No. 15AP-852, 2016 WL 1461839, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14,
2016) (“[T]he trial court judge consistently referred to the girls as ‘victims,’” which the appellate
court said was, “in essence . . . telling the members of the jury that the girls were truthful when
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suggested above, even if we assume truth and accuracy as regards the
claim, there is a far more concerning issue—more concerning in part
because it is rarely discussed. This issue is that identifying a claim
(whether by law enforcement or by a complainant) with crime threatens
the viability of core components of the criminal law, such as defenses
and mens rea. Complainants or law enforcement may speak with
absolute honesty and accuracy, but we rely on a two-sided adversary
system because those qualities are not enough: 286 our criminal law
encompasses defenses whose assessment may require hearing from the
defense; our criminal law encompasses elements such as mens rea,
whose assessment again may require hearing from the defense. 287 With
every endorsement of a regime in which law enforcement’s (or a
complaining witness’s) claims, no matter how truthful and accurate, are
taken as establishing a crime, we threaten further to erode these core
definitional components of crime. As a result, we threaten to reduce
interest in providing adequate defense resources and protections. 288 We
are at risk of adhering more to lay senses of what “crime” is than to
formally defined (and often narrower) notions of what “crime” is. 289 As
one example, the case law again and again reveals judges who are unable
to appreciate that in a self-defense case there may be no crime, no
wrong, and no tort, however grievous the injuries caused by the
defendant may have been. 290
To treat pre-adjudication claims of crime, whether they are made
by law enforcement or by complainants, as equivalent to crime is often
to assume prematurely the guilt of the person alleged to have committed
they claimed that sexual abuse occurred, as opposed to telling the jury Almedom was truthful in
his denial, or refusing to comment on the credibility of any potential witnesses.”); Gruber, supra
note 230, at 661–62 (“By giving these complainants rights as ‘victims,’ the law presupposes that
the complainants’ version of events is true (and by implication the defendants’ is not true.) From
the beginning, then, the designated victim—most likely designated by the prosecution—is
innocent beyond doubt, absolutely truthful, and even deserving of reverence.”).
286 See Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671,
701–02 (1999) (“There are some significant similarities between the crime control model and
punitive forms of victims’ rights. They both focus on factual as opposed to legal guilt. It is the
commission of the criminal act as reported by victims to researchers or the police, not the state’s
ability to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or compliance with legal rights, which defines
victimization.”).
287 See Gruber, supra note 230, at 661 (“Victims’ Bills of Rights and other reforms confer pretrial rights to ‘victims’ even in cases where the defense contests that any crime has occurred (i.e.,
non-injurious assault cases or rapes).”).
288 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 1022–24.
289 See id. at 1017 (“[O]nly some homicides are crimes, and only some criminal homicides are
murders. It is not unusual, however, for reporting of homicide rates to betray the assumption
that they are crime rates and indeed to refer to them as ‘murder rates.’”); infra Section IV.E.
290 See supra Section I.B.
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a crime, 291 and to do so via means other than the formal systems and
tools set up for adjudication. 292 Again, tendencies toward such
premature judgments appear all over the law and legal scholarship—
note, for example, the frequency with which judges, legislatures, and
legal scholars use the word “offender” to refer to someone who has
merely been arrested or charged 293—and need to be resisted. 294
III.

POSSIBLE REFORMS

Part I examined a range of legal contexts in which uses of “victim”
are in tension with a key definitional component of the word and key
components of the criminal system. It revealed three methods
commonly used to address that tension: first, ignoring it; second,
defining “victim” in a way that lacks semantic support (i.e. as “alleged
victim”); or third, defining “victim” in a way that lacks adjudicative
support (i.e. as “person who has been harmed by a crime”). If, as Part II
suggests, this tension remains problematic despite these unconvincing
efforts at resolution, then the first thing that one might turn to is reform.
This Part will recognize reform efforts that have been made in order to
adjust language to fit better with the fundamental precepts of the
system, and will discuss other ones that could be tried.
Trying to reform these language usages would involve using
alternative terms in contexts that are squarely legal, criminal, and preadjudication. Such efforts could target a variety of groups that have
contributed to the prevalence of the word “victim” in this kind of
context, such as prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, witnesses, and
drafters of jury instructions.
291 See State v. Sperou, 442 P.3d 581, 591 (Or. 2019) (“[J]ust as it would be improper for
defendant to be called a ‘criminal’ or ‘guilty person’ throughout trial, giving a complaining
witness a title that assumes a defendant’s guilt tends to undermine the principle that the state has
the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
292 See Capers, supra note 210 (detailing the use of “evidence” beyond the conception of the
evidence rules drafters); Jason Wool, Maintaining the Presumption of Innocence in Date Rape
Trials Through the Use of Language Orders: State v. Safi and the Banning of the Word “Rape”, 15
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 193, 201–02 (2008) (“[F]or Safi, the [language] order signified an
attempt to prevent the prosecution from labeling him as guilty of a very serious crime before the
jury had heard all of the facts.”); JoAnne Young, Banned Words at Rape Trial Resonate Years
After, LINCOLN J. STAR (July 6, 2015), https://journalstar.com/news/local/banned-words-at-rapetrial-resonate-years-after/article_54ab3019-6838-54d2-a982-f8712d171b88.html
[https://perma.cc/J33V-X8NQ] (quoting defense attorney’s statement that terms such as “victim”
allow the prosecutor “to suggest through language that the accused is guilty of a crime, when they
wouldn’t be able to say it directly under the rules of evidence.”).
293 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22.
294 See id. at 1022–29 (discussing some of the risks of equating charges with guilt).
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One can imagine a series of training programs that could be
instituted to help bring about this kind of reform. So, for example, those
who draft, apply, and revise jury instructions could be encouraged to
screen them for the use of the word “victim,” and to consider
substituting less problematic alternatives. 295 Reform efforts in Vermont
and Connecticut offer two potential models. 296
Prosecutorial trainings could use various dimensions of this issue
as a means of exploring what it might mean to “do justice” in trial
litigation. 297 While it is clear that this prosecutorial mandate means
something other than the single-minded pursuit of convictions, 298
scholars have highlighted the lack of more detailed guidance. 299 One
potential facet of such a duty is taking an active role in shaping police
behavior, 300 and this could include instructing police witnesses to avoid
the word “victim” in their testimony. 301 Prosecutors could also consider
the possibility of avoiding the word “victim” in indictments, given that
the indictments may be read to the jury; 302 judges may import the word
from the indictments into jury instructions; 303 and the word’s
appearance in indictments may be invoked to support a finding that its
appearance elsewhere was harmless. 304 Prosecutors could also consider

See People v. Allen, No. E065202, 2017 WL 4927712, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2017).
See CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIM. JURY
INSTRUCTION COMM. (2019), https://jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D2FW-B7A9] (mentioning decision to replace “victim” with “decedent” or “complainant” in
statutory language used in jury instructions); VERMONT TRIAL COURT JURY INSTRUCTION
PROJECT (2010), http://www.vtbar.org/UserFiles/Files/WebPages/Attorney%20Resources/
juryinstructions/criminaljuryinstructions/notes.htm
[https://perma.cc/5DKM-67GR]
(instructions drafted in accord with recommendation that “judges, lawyers and witnesses
(especially police) should avoid the word ‘victim’”).
297 See State v. Rodriguez, 946 A.2d 294, 301 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (“Referring to Castaneda
as the victim, the state asserted, is consistent with the role of a prosecutor seeking justice for the
citizens of the state.”).
298 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
299 See Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203 (2020).
300 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 1029 n.294.
301 See Gomez v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No 6:18cv89, 2019 WL 2521675, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Apr.
1, 2019) (Mr. Gomez “states that the prosecutor ‘[elicited] and/or coached witnesses they called
to the stand to refer to the complainant as a “victim” during their testimony.’”); State v. Lott, No.
A16-0969, 2017 WL 2226701, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. May 22, 2017) (“The state has a duty to
prepare its witnesses, prior to testifying, to avoid inadmissible or prejudicial statements.”).
302 See State v. Albino, 24 A.3d 602, 616 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (“[T]he term ‘victim’ is also
used in the indictment . . . as it is routinely in criminal charges which are read to the jury.”).
303 See Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 886 (Ct. Crim. Apps. Tex. 2007) (quoting trial judge
rejecting defense objection to charge by saying that “I can’t change the wording of the
Indictment . . . [and] the application paragraph has got to track the Indictment”).
304 See Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21, 25 (1991).
295
296
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avoiding the word in their own utterances at trial, 305 given the risk that
use of the term “may cause the jury to draw an improper inference that
the defendant committed a crime against the complainant.” 306 They
should be particularly vigilant in those instances where language orders
have been issued forbidding the word’s use, 307 despite the fact that
harmless error rules create an incentive for prosecutors to be (at least)
careless as regards the risk of error. 308 Indeed, prosecutors could
consider joining motions for language orders banning the use of the
word “victim.” 309
Prosecutorial trainings could also use this issue as a means of
exploring what it might mean to “do justice” beyond trial litigation. In
analyzing how this goal might be applied to appellate litigation,
prosecutors could consider whether it might include approaches that
are something other than maximally aggressive. 310 They might, for
example, refrain from arguing at the appellate level that certain errors
were harmless. 311 Prosecutors could also examine the many ways in

305 Mahone v. Eden, No. 1:15-cv-01009-PJK-KBM, 2019 WL 2724054, at *1 (D.N.M. June 28,
2019) (“[T]he case should be decided on the evidence, not labels.”); Clarence Mabin, Banned
Words Debated in Sex Assault Case, LINCOLN J. STAR (June 16, 2007), https://journalstar.com/
news/local/banned-words-debated-in-sex-assault-case/article_172ad305-2315-58a0-8109310661de8d1c.html [https://perma.cc/BDN6-5QH8] (“A prosecutor who has the facts does not
have to rely on words like ‘victim’ or ‘rape.’”).
306 State v. Warholic, 897 A.2d 569, 584 n.7 (2006) (cautioning the state “against making
excessive use of the term ‘victim’ to describe a complainant when the commission of a crime is
at issue,” for that reason).
307 See State v. Thompson, 76 A.3d 273, 286 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013).
308 See Darryl Brown, Does it Matter Who Objects? Rethinking the Burden to Prevent Errors in
Criminal Process, 98 TEX. L. REV. 101, 118 (2020); Gabe Newland, Harmless Error Explained, THE
APPEAL (Nov. 11, 2019), https://theappeal.org/harmless-error-explained [https://perma.cc/
PGK7-APB9].
309 See, e.g., Grady v. Warden, No. CV144006185S, 2019 WL 1093301, at *6 (Sup. Ct. Conn.
Jan. 28, 2019) (“The prosecutor did not have an objection to the motion in limine and
acknowledged that the state of the law supported the defense’s motion . . . .”).
310 See Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21, 25 (1991) (prosecution described as engaging in an
“overreactive misreading” of the court’s ruling on the word “victim” after they filed a “motion
for clarification of opinion and/or rehearing en banc” due to concerns that the court’s dicta
resulted in “banning” of the use of the word “victim”); Anna Roberts, Foster v. Chatman: An
Egregious Batson Violation (and a SCOTUS Reversal), CASETEXT (May 24, 2016),
https://casetext.com/analysis/foster-v-chatman-an-egregious-batson-violation-and-a-scotusreversal [https://perma.cc/T7HT-TM42] (discussing the meaning of “doing justice” in the
appellate context).
311 Newland, supra note 308; State v. Cortes, 885 A.2d 153, 158 n.4 (“Although the state
concedes that the trial court’s seventy-six references to the complainant as the “victim” in its jury
charge were improper, it argues that such references constituted harmless error because the entire
charge adequately conveyed that the complainant was merely alleged to be the victim of a crime.
The state’s contention is, at best, dubious. The trial court’s seventy-six references to the
complainant as the “victim” were neither isolated nor sporadic, but pervasive. . . . In the context
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which they might fulfill their duty to seek to reform the criminal
system. 312 Where they operate in a jurisdiction whose pattern
instructions contain problematic uses of the word “victim,” for
example, they might take an active role in pushing for those instructions
to be amended.
Judicial trainings could emphasize the importance of modifying
statutory language and pattern instructions when crafting jury
instructions, 313 where they contain problematic references to “victims,”
even if they might provide a safe harbor from reversal. Judges should
also think about other ways to play a preemptive role on this issue,
particularly given the multitude of obstacles that prevent defendants
from getting relief after error occurs. 314 They could discuss, for example,
whether the Supreme Court of Hawaii is right that “unless there are
good reasons found by the court for permitting otherwise, the court
should instruct all counsel that they and their witnesses must refrain
from using the term [‘victim.’]” 315 Judges could usefully review the 1860
case People v. Williams, including the salutary warnings that “in a case
of conflicting proof, even an equivocal expression coming from the
Judge, may be fatal to the prisoner,” 316 and that “[a] judge cannot be too
cautious in a criminal trial in avoiding all interference with the
conclusions of the jury upon the facts . . . .” 317
Defense training in this area could provide useful opportunities to
think about ways in which the defense might either combat or
compound injustice. Defense attorneys could start by examining the
importance of avoiding this usage themselves (unless sound strategic
reasons support it), including in stipulations, 318 and proposed jury

of the present case, the jury could have drawn only one inference from [‘victim’s’] repeated use,
namely, that the defendant had committed a crime against the complainant.”).
312 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-1.2(f) (4th ed., AM.
BAR. ASS’N) (“The prosecutor should seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal
justice.”) Part of that work might be resisting proposed reforms, such as Marsy’s Law. See, e.g.,
Shane Young, Heather Gatnarek, Scott Hofstra, Jan Skavdahl, & Sen. John Schickel, OpEd: We
All Agree, Marsy’s Law Offers Only Empty Promises, FORWARD KY. (Mar 2, 2020),
https://forwardky.com/oped-we-all-agree-marsys-law-offers-only-empty-promises
[https://perma. cc/3AUJ-5CY2] (prosecutor and others opposing Kentucky’s Marsy Law).
313 See State v. Walston, 766 S.E.2d 312, 319 (N.C. 2014); State v. McKinney, No. A-194613T1, 2017 WL 370918, at *14 n.12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (noting that the word “victim”
appears in some Model Jury Charges, but adding that “Model Jury Charges are not binding but
merely helpful guides to trial judges”).
314 See supra Section I.B.
315 State v. Mundon, 292 P.3d 205, 230 (Haw. 2012).
316 People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142, 147 (1860).
317 Id.
318 See State v. Alger, 640 P.2d 44, 46–47 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
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instructions. 319 Defense attorneys should also consider making greater
use of in limine motions for language orders, particularly in light of the
difficulty of “un-ringing the bell,” and of getting relief, once an
objectionable usage has occurred. 320 In one recent case, the federal
defender moved for such an order but with no supporting case law or
argument, 321 so dissemination of relevant precedent and potential
arguments would be helpful, particularly given the relative novelty of
such tools. 322 Examples of successful motions for language orders could
persuade defense attorneys that you do not need to be Bill Cosby’s
attorney, 323 or Kobe Bryant’s, 324 to try this (though their legal
memoranda might provide useful templates). You do not have to be
Jeffrey Epstein’s counsel to contest declarations of “victim” status that
occur before adjudication has occurred. 325 More generally, trainings
could emphasize the importance of considering objections to the use of
this word, 326 particularly given the obstacles to appellate review, 327 not
to mention the risk of an ineffectiveness claim, 328 that silence creates. A
useful cautionary tale would be a recent Vermont case, State v. Burke,
in which, when a detective violated the pre-trial order, the only person
319 See State v. Santiago, 917 A.2d 1051, 1060 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (“In his requested
instruction concerning the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant used the term
‘victim’ eleven times.”).
320 See State v. Sperou, 442 P.3d 581 (Or. 2019).
321 See United States v. Lussier, No. 18-CR-281, 2019 WL 2489906, at *5 (D. Minn. 2019);
Liska v. Anchorage, No. A-6351 1998 WL 191166, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1998)
(mentioning defense’s failure to cite any authority).
322 See Wool, supra note 292, at 217–18.
323 Defendant’s Motion In Limine to Exclude All References to Ms. Constand and the 404(b)
Witness as “Victims,” Pennsylvania v. Cosby, No. CP-46-0003932 (2017),
https://www.montcopa.org/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/3818
[https://perma.cc/AFG6EWYW].
324 See Wool, supra note 292, at 216 (citing Kobe Bryant’s defense attorney for the proposition
that “defense attorneys pretty routinely get orders precluding use of the term [victim] in cases
where consent is the defense”); Dahlia Lithwick, Gag Order, SLATE (June 20, 2007, 7:27 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2007/06/a-nebraska-judge-bans-the-word-rape-from-hiscourtroom.html [https://perma.cc/3AY6-V652] (noting a growing trend, and one that has
expanded from the language of prosecutors to that of witnesses).
325 See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp.3d 1201, 1211–12 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
326 See State v. Jorge P., 4 A.3d 314, 321 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014) (“The defendant acknowledges
that although the court used the word ‘victim’ fourteen times during the trial, he did not object
and that this claim is raised for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Almedom, No. 15AP-852, 2016
WL 1461839, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2016) (“For reasons that are not clear, defense counsel
[in a case that “involved allegations which in all likelihood would cause Almedom to be
incarcerated for the rest of his life if found to be true”] never objected to the trial judge’s
comments even though the references began before any witnesses had testified.”); id. (“Defense
counsel sat mum during the repeated references [by the court to ‘the victims.’]”).
327 Of course, there are claims that in at least some instances silence is strategic.
328 See, e.g., Almedom, 2016 WL 1461839.
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in the courtroom to object was Mr. Burke himself, who spoke up, saying
“You’re not supposed to be saying the victim. That’s been barred.” 329
Defense training in this area could also provide illustrations of the
importance of persistence, and of defense attorneys’ ability to bring
about change. Defense attorneys at both the trial and appellate level
could study the example of North Carolina, where repeated defense
challenges to the use of pattern jury instructions strewn with the word
“victim” went nowhere, 330 until eventually the instructions were
amended, at least as to one offense. 331 That a trial court practice—this
or any other—is “deeply engrained” need not preclude efforts to change
it. 332 Defense attorneys could also be trained on affirmative litigation
prospects: members of the defense bar were key to litigation efforts
aimed at blocking Marsy’s Law in various states. 333
Police trainings could be useful too. The topic of how to refer to
complaining witnesses could be included in police officers’ training on
how to testify; if the topic is already included, 334 then the prescription
could be changed. And if it is true that part of why one hears police
witnesses use the word “victim” for complaining witness so often is that

329 Burke v. Pallito, No. 2:12 CV 197, 2013 WL 6145810, at *20 (D. Vt. Nov. 21, 2013) (adding
that the judge’s response was “Oh, let Mr. Maguire [the defense attorney] handle it,” and that in
response to two further violations of the order “there was no objection”).
330 See, e.g., State v. Carrigan, 589 S.E.2d 134, 139 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting defendant’s
argument that trial court’s use of “victim” forty times in jury instructions was plain error, and
mentioning in support of its finding the fact that “the word ‘victim’ is used in North Carolina
pattern jury instructions for first degree rape and first degree sexual offense charges”); State v.
Tarleton, No. COA12-916, 2013 WL 1901843, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2013) (“Our courts
typically do not find plain error when the trial court referred to the witness as ‘the victim’ in the
jury charge, particularly when the instructions follow the pattern instructions.”); State v. Kirk,
No. COA10-566, 2010 WL 5421434, at *3 (N.C. App., Dec. 21, 2010) (“[T]he relevant pattern
jury instructions use the phrase ‘the victim’ throughout.”).
331 See
N.C.P.I.—CRIM. 207.45.1 (amended 2016), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/
www.sog.unc.edu/files/pji-master-2019/criminal/r207.45.1%20[2016].pdf
[https://perma.cc/
XG62-FP6F] (amended post-Walston, so that “victim” is replaced throughout by “alleged
victim”); see also id. at 207.45.1A (amended 2016) (for later alleged offenses).
332 Kirk Johnson, Judge Rules [Kobe] Bryant Accuser May Not Be Called ‘Victim,’ N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2004, at A13 (“Legal experts said the judge’s decision was highly unusual, mostly because
lawyers so rarely question the deeply engrained terms of trial court.”).
333 See Westerfield v. Ward, 599 S.W.3d 738 (Ky. 2019) (association of criminal defense
lawyers among those getting Kentucky Marsy’s Law amendment declared unconstitutional);
Montana Ass’n of Ctys. v. State, 404 P.3d 733 (Mont. 2017) (same in Montana).
334 See Adam Johnson & Jim Naureckas, Copspeak: When Black Children Suddenly Become
‘Juveniles,’ FAIR (Mar. 19, 2018), https://fair.org/home/copspeak-when-black-childrensuddenly-become-juveniles [https://perma.cc/PTF3-NDEQ] (saying, as regards the word
“juvenile” being used by the police in place of “child,” that it is part of “an institutional lexicon
developed over decades of public relations fine-tuning”).
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“victim” is the term of art among police for complaining witnesses, 335
the term of art should perhaps be changed, given that it is in tension
with fundamental aspects of the criminal law.
There is certainly potential for positive change here. Since
language has the ability either to reinforce or to challenge
assumptions, 336 the hope might be that as language shifts, the attitudes
expressed and reinforced by the language might shift as a result. 337
Efforts to change language use are strengthening as regards words like
“felon,” 338 “inmate,” 339 “convict,” 340 “prisoner,” 341 “perpetrator,” 342
“offender,” 343 “ex-con,” 344 ex-offender, 345 “rapist,” 346 “criminal,” 347 and
so on; 348 perhaps the same could happen with “victim.” One can see
positive language change in adjustments made to some jury instructions
that were challenged on the basis that they referred to the complainant

335 See People v. Johnson, No. C047560, 2005 WL 3476530, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005)
(police witness “indicated people are commonly either suspects, victims, or witnesses”).
336 Victoria Law & Rachel Roth, Names Do Hurt: The Case Against Using Derogatory Language
to Describe People in Prison, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (Apr. 20, 2015, 1:53 PM), https://rewire.news/
article/2015/04/20/case-using-derogatory-language-describe-person-prison [https://perma.cc/
7NB2-3VA2] (“The way we write and speak helps shape people’s perceptions about the world.”).
337 See A. Rachel Camp, Pursuing Accountability for Perpetrators of Intimate Partner Violence:
The Peril (and Utility?) of Shame, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1677 (2018) (describing how society’s
perceptions about individuals change based on labels assigned).
338 See Law & Roth, supra note 336.
339 See
Words Matter: Using Humanizing Language, THE FORTUNE SOC’Y,
https://fortunesociety.org/wordsmatter [https://perma.cc/65A5-VY8G] (listing “words to avoid”
such as “offender, inmate, felon, criminal, convict, prisoner, delinquent,” and “sex offender”).
340 See id.
341 See id.
342 See Erin George & Ravi Mangla, How Dehumanizing Language Fuels Mass Incarceration,
COMMON DREAMS (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/10/01/howdehumanizing-language-fuels-mass-incarceration
[https://perma.cc/84P6-CT5V]
(“Decarceration advocates must hold policymakers, media outlets, and public figures
accountable for promoting a language that allows for shifts in the broader consciousness.”).
343 Law & Roth, supra note 336; Lynn S. Branham, Eradicating the Label “Offender” From the
Lexicon of Restorative Practices and Criminal Justice, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2020).
344 Law & Roth, supra note 336.
345 See id.
346 McCormick, supra note 267.
347 Nancy G. La Vigne, People First: Changing the Way We Talk About Those Touched by the
Criminal Justice System, URBAN WIRE (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/peoplefirst-changing-way-we-talk-about-those-touched-criminal-justice-system
[https://perma.cc/
22BF-44Q5].
348 See Deanna R. Hoskins, Language Matters for Justice Reform, THE HILL (June 30, 2019,
5:55PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/451099-language-matters-for-justicereform [https://perma.cc/M9T6-L8WW].
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as “the victim;” 349 in the increasing use of language orders; 350 and in
some shifts in the language used in statutes and rules. 351
Several complexities need to be addressed by those attempting this
kind of reform, and a discussion of four of them follows: the scale of the
project; the scale of related projects; the risk of entrenching the system;
and the question of which alternative term to use.
A.

Scale of this Task

Attempting to end usages of this kind would be a significant
undertaking. Every state’s law now contains at least one provision that
refers to complainants as “victims;” 352 one finds the same in federal
statutes. 353 In addition, “victim” appears in pre-adjudication legal
contexts not just on its own but in all sorts of combinations, such as
“victim support,” 354 “victim advocate,” 355 “crime victim assistance
board,” 356 “counselor-victim privilege,” 357 and so on.
In addition, while this Article is focused on those pre-adjudication
legal contexts where one would expect legal definitions to hold sway,
those pushing for reform may have to confront the question of where
the line should be drawn. What should one say, for example, about
media reports? What should one say about legal scholarship? 358 What
349 Thus, for example, in a 2018 California case, the defense complained that the California
jury instruction on homicide and self-defense referred to “the victim.” People v. Lovely No.
F071158, 2018 WL 1980960 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2018). The instruction now indicates that
judges should use the name of the “decedent/victim” instead. 505 Justifiable Homicide: SelfDefense or Defense of Another, JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTION (Nov. 2020 ed.)
350 See Lithwick, supra note 324.
351 For example, West Virginia’s new version of 61-8B-11 uses “alleged victim” several times,
in contrast to the previous version’s exclusive reliance on “victim.” W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11
(2020).
352 Compilation of state provisions on file with author.
353 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325–26 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing
the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771); Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 (“[S]hall not order any victim of an offense excluded from the trial of
a defendant accused of that offense . . . .”).
354 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2 (2019).
355 See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69.030(10) (2009); State v. Gault, 39 A.3d 1105, 1114 (Conn.
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.575 (2020).
356 See IOWA CODE § 915.82 (2013).
357 See, e.g., People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 564 (Mich. 1994).
358 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims’ Rights Movement Have Influence over
Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 749, 755 (2002) (“There are
a variety of proposals for victim involvement in the criminal justice process. Many are
unobjectionable, even important. For example, a recent U.S. Department of Justice report urges
that victims have a right to notification of bail . . . .”).
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about courts—including our Supreme Court—that regularly use
“victim” in their opinions to refer to those alleged to have been harmed
by crime? 359 The further one gets from contexts such as jury instructions
and “victims’ rights” amendments, where one would expect legal
definitions to hold sway, the harder it becomes to draw a clear line
between “victim” as legal term and “victim” as lay concept, and the
harder it becomes to lay down prescriptions, particularly given the
power of arguments that those who claim harm should be able to choose
their own terms. 360
Finally, if the use of the word has indeed come to be seen by some
as a means of bestowing things like fairness, respect, and dignity, 361 its
retraction is likely to provoke resistance. 362 This may be particularly true

359 This is quite common in the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause cases, for example.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 366 (2011) (“Another factor the Michigan Supreme
Court did not sufficiently account for is the importance of informality in an encounter between
a victim and police.”); id. at 368 (“Victims are also likely to have mixed motives when they make
statements to the police.”); Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 242 (2015) (“[U]nder Ohio Rule of
Evidence 807, which allows the admission of reliable hearsay by child abuse victims, the court
ruled that L.P.’s statements to his teachers bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be
admitted as evidence.”); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990) (“We . . . conclude today
that a State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be
sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her
accusers in court.”). But see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 808 (1990) (“The alleged victims were
respondent’s two daughters, one of whom was 5 1/2 and the other 2 1/2 years old at the time the
crimes were charged.”). Here the Supreme Court is just used as an example. This usage abounds
in lower courts too. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 15-174, 2016 WL 10704518, at *5 (E.D.
La. Jan. 28, 2016) (“By its second motion, the government seeks to preclude the defendant from
offering evidence or eliciting testimony concerning the victims’ prior sexual history.”); Stoot v.
City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Law enforcement officers may obviously rely
on statements made by the victims of a crime to identify potential suspects.”); United States v.
Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1016 (10th Cir. 2002) (“We reject any suggestion that victims of domestic
violence are unreliable witnesses whose testimony cannot establish probable cause absent
independent corroboration.”). Some courts, however, are careful to note the complications
involved in using the term pre-adjudication. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 178 F. Supp.
3d 86, 89 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The ‘victims’ are, of course, ‘alleged victims.’ For the sake of
brevity, however, the Court refers to them as ‘victims.’”) (citing FED. R. EVID. 412(d) (“In this
rule, ‘victim’ includes an alleged victim.”)); United States v. Underwood, 47 M.J. 805, 809 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 1997) (“I use the term alleged victim, not victims because they’re not victims until
someone decides they’re victims.”).
360 See Negar Katirai, Retraumatized in Court, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 81, 83 n.1 (2020) (stating that
in choosing between “victim” and “survivor,” the best practice “may be to follow the lead of the
person who has experienced the violence”).
361 See, e.g., NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 149, at 2 (stating that the use of “alleged
victim” or “complainant” violates “a victim’s right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and
respect”).
362 See Gruber, supra note 230, at 655 n.43 (“[T]he victims’ rights movement was intimately
tied to the outcry against unfair treatment of battered women by the legal process.”).
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in light of past and present failings—public and private—to accord
fairness, respect, and dignity to members of subordinated groups.
B.

Size of Related Tasks

The reform project in question would be an ambitious one not just
because of the pervasiveness of this usage but also because a consistent
approach would mean that multiple other terms would have to be
uprooted. Throughout legal scholarship, statutes, constitutional
provisions, and courtroom terminology one finds other phrases that
appear to take a pre-adjudication allegation and treat it like a fact, and
specifically like a crime. These include “crime scene,” 363 “rape kit,” 364
“rape crisis counselor,” 365 “rape shield,” 366 “fleeing felon,” 367 “juvenile
offender” 368 “youthful offender,” 369 “adolescent offender,” 370 “murder
weapon,” 371 “perp walk,” 372 “sexual assault kit,” 373 “sexual assault nurse

363 See Ridling v. State, 203 S.W.3d 63, 75–76 (Ark. 2005); Pierce v. State, No. 111, 2009 WL
189150, at *1 (Del. Jan. 16, 2009) (mentioning the defendant’s argument that his counsel “should
have objected to the terms ‘victim,’ ‘sexual assault,’ and ‘crime scene’”).
364 See Order to Show Cause Plaintiff’s Response at 4, Bowen v. Cheuvront, No. 4:07CV3221,
516 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Neb. 2007), http://www.onpointnews.com/docs/cheuvront2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CHR-CP4Z] (stating that the court “ordered that the ‘rape kit’ or ‘sexual
assault kit’ be referred to as the ‘sexual examination kit’ and the SANE (Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner) Nurse be referred to as the ‘sexual examiner’”).
365 See, e.g., People v. Albarran, 2018 IL App (1st) 151508, ¶ 68.
366 See John Leubsdorf, Fringes: Evidence Law Beyond the Federal Rules, 51 IND. L. REV. 613,
628 (2018) (“[R]ape shield provisions . . . limit cross-examination of complaining witnesses
about their sexual history.”).
367 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
368 See Crimes Committed by Children Between 7–18, N.Y. COURTS, https://www.nycourts.
gov/courthelp/Criminal/crimesByChildren.shtml [https://perma.cc/BYU4-QH8V].
369 See id.
370 See Adolescent Offenders, N.Y. COURTS, https:/www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Criminal/
adolescentOffender.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20191220053848] (“Due to the Raise the
Age law, all 16 years olds [sic] charged with felony offenses on or after October 1, 2018, are treated
as adolescent offenders (AO).”).
371 See State v. Kurrus, 49 A.3d 260, 271 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (stating that “the repeated use
of the words ‘victim,’ ‘murder’ and ‘murder weapon’ throughout trial by the prosecutor is
improper”).
372 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 999 (pointing out that at the arrest stage
there is no “perp[etrator]”).
373 See Bowen v. Cheuvront, 516 F. Supp.2d 1021, 1023 (D. Neb. 2007) (mentioning that the
court issued an order “forbidding all witnesses [from using] the words: ‘rape,’ ‘victim,’ ‘assailant,’
‘sexual assault kit’ and ‘sexual assault nurse examiner.’”).
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examiner,” 374 and “sexual assault response team.” 375 The use of words
that could be said to contain embedded assumptions of crime and guilt
is pervasive and so engrained as to go largely unmentioned. 376
C.

Risk of Entrenching the System

Those pushing for reform in this area run two related risks: first,
that by attempting to ameliorate an aspect of the criminal system they
might appear to, or might actually, reinforce that system. 377
Abolitionists have made a persuasive case that so-called “reformist
reforms” 378—those that fail to shrink the criminal system—may have
the undesirable effect of entrenching that system. 379
The second and related risk is that by objecting to the use of the
word “victim” pre-conviction, reformers might appear to, or might
actually, endorse its use post-conviction. I have written elsewhere about
elements of our criminal system—the overwhelming pressure to plead
guilty, for example, and the inadequate provision of defense
resources—that ought to unsettle the apparent willingness of some
academics to treat crime conviction as synonymous with crime
commission. 380 That same analysis cautions against comfort with the
word “victim”—if one takes it to mean someone who has suffered
crime—even in the post-conviction context.
D.

Choice of Alternative Terms

None of the obvious alternative terms is without its critics.
“Victim” is a fraught term for reasons other than those on which this
piece centers; 381 sticking an “alleged” in front fails to remove those

374
375

2019).

See id.
See, e.g., People v. Lemma, No. D073689, 2019 WL 2520692, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 19,

376 See Tollefson v. Stephens, No. SA:14-CV-144-DAE, 2014 WL 7339119, at *6 (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 23, 2014) (“Terms like ‘victim,’ ‘murder,’ ‘crime,’ and ‘crime scene’ are frequently used in
homicide trials . . . .”).
377 See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 240, at 1643 (stating that “efforts to reform criminal legal
processes in order to attempt to realize idealized visions of justice are doomed to simply further
entrench existing injustices if they are not accompanied by more transformative demands”).
378 See, e.g., id. at 1616 n.21.
379 See id. at 1643.
380 See Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, supra note 2.
381 See, e.g., Weissman, supra note 221, at 1492 n.61 (noting that the term “victim” is a
“‘passive notion’ derived from the Latin word for a sacrificial animal”).

1498

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:4

concerns and may add new ones. 382 “Complaining witness” may be
ambiguous. 383 And terms such as “complaining witness,”
“complainant,” or “prosecuting witness” 384 may fail accurately to
convey the fact that prosecution in our system is generally led by the
prosecutor, 385 rather than by the individual whose injury is alleged; 386 a
similar problem attaches to “accuser.” 387 “Prosecutrix” has unwelcome
gendered overtones. 388 And one could go on. One defense attorney
objected to “complainant” in a homicide case on the grounds that it
appeared to imply that the deceased was “not an accident victim,” 389 and
that it “raised a prejudicial inference that she was ‘crying for vengeance
from her grave.’” 390 Terms like “survivor” and “harmed party,” 391 even
382 Note that the word may dissatisfy opposite camps, being taken on the one hand as a
meaningless technicality and understood to be so, and on the other hand a slur on a
complainant’s credibility. For the latter, see NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 149, at 2
(“Synonyms for ‘alleged’ include ‘dubious,’ ‘questionable,’ ‘suspect,’ ‘suspicious,’ and ‘so-called.’
Referring to a victim in such a manner implies that the victim is not truly a victim, but is instead
fabricating the charges.”); McDonald, supra note 211, at 269 (“Use of the modifier—‘alleged’—
casts aspersions on the credibility of the accuser . . . .”); Z.W. v. Foster, 422 P.3d 582, 583 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2018) (“Z.W. challenges the superior court’s ruling denying her request to preclude
reference to her as the ‘alleged victim.’ She argues [unsuccessfully] that allowing defense counsel
to refer to her in that manner, rather than simply as the ‘victim,’ necessarily violates her statutory
and constitutional rights under Arizona’s Victims’ Bill of Rights.”).
383 For other concerns, see McDonald, supra note 211, at 269 (“The prosecution in People v.
Bryant argued that use of any word other than victim would carry with it potential confusion and
inaccuracy. The rationale was that the use of the terms ‘accuser’ or ‘complaining witness’ violated
the victim’s constitutional and statutory right to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity.
‘Accuser,’ the government argued, is confusing, misleading, and legally inaccurate, while
‘complaining witness’ can refer to the victim, the outcry witness, or the police officer who
submitted reports.”).
384 See Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1999).
385 See I. Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1561 (2020); Susan
Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331.
386 See McDonald, supra note 211, at 270.
387 See id. For other concerns, see Michele Sharpe, Who’s a Victim? Who’s an ‘Accuser’? The
Loaded Language of Sexual Assault, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018, 5:29 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/09/27/whos-victim-whos-an-accuser-loadedlanguage-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/W9TB-ANXW] (“A superficially neutral term such as
‘accuser’ comes freighted with an entire patriarchal history.”); Johnson, supra note 332 (“Some
women’s advocacy groups say that ‘accuser’ is prejudicial and should not be used.”).
388 See Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal
for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765 n.4 (1986) (“The designation ‘prosecutrix’ is
fast becoming obsolete because of feminist assertions that it evokes the image of a vindictive
woman whose testimony is suspect.”).
389 Turro v. State, 950 S.W.2d 390, 405 (Tex. App. 1997).
390 Id.
391 See Katirai, supra note 360, at 83 n.1 (“The word ‘victim’ is typically used by members of
law enforcement and within the context of courtroom proceedings, but for many, ‘survivor’
speaks to a sense of empowerment.”); Danielle Sered, A New Approach to Victim Services: The
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while they steer clear of appearing to assume crime commission,
encapsulate related factual conclusions—that something bad happened,
that it caused harm—that still are problematic in pre-adjudication
criminal contexts, when that remains to be proven.
Maybe it’s not strange that the perfect word does not present itself.
There is a tension within a system that purports to champion the
individual even while emphasizing that the prosecution runs the
show: 392 even as “victims’ rights” become more numerous, the process
is still not led by those who have them. 393
However, while the criminal system persists, if we take seriously
the objection to a term that appears to answer one of the questions that
is to be answered by other means, then options such as “alleged victim”
or “complainant,” or (where death has occurred) “decedent,” are
preferable to “victim.” In some contexts, using the person’s name is also
a possible option.
IV.

WHERE MIGHT THIS USAGE COME FROM?

The previous Part laid out some complications with taking a
reformist approach to this issue. This Part expands on one such
complication, suggesting that a necessary part of assessing the likely
value of reform efforts is attempting to understand what is fueling the
problematic phenomenon.
The previous Part offered reasons to be concerned about the
potential effects of this usage. This Part suggests that there are also
reasons to be concerned about what might potentially contribute to this
usage. It suggests that it is hard for language usages to gain and maintain
such prevalence—particularly where they are usages that clash with
legal definitions—unless something powerful fuels them. 394 What might
it be that leads even those who trade in words, definitions, precision,

Common Justice Demonstration Project, 24 FED. SENT’G. R. 50, 50 (2011) (describing choice to
refer to “harmed party” and “responsible party”).
392 See State v. McKinley, No. 8-05-14, 2006 WL 1381635 (Ohio Ct. App. May 22, 2006); Julia
O’Donoghue, DAs Oppose Bill to Stop Jailing Rape, Abuse Victims, TIMES-PICAYUNE: NOLA.COM
(July 22, 2019, 3:12 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/article_8ef63206-0a0a-5717-bf06fb9868f07414.html [https://perma.cc/XVV6-LX9B]; Caplow, supra note 26, at 12 (“Most
prosecutors are chary of victim participation, fearing undue interference with their case
processing, resulting in at best begrudging, minimal inclusion in, but more often virtual exclusion
from, all decision making.”).
393 See Weissman, supra note 221, at 1494.
394 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 1012 (hypothesizing that a common error
about plea bargaining rates would not persist so widely were it not in tune with common
assumptions).

1500

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:4

and accuracy, to adopt this word that appears to elide the most central
distinction within criminal procedure and criminal law theory, often
without acknowledging the issue? 395 And what can we learn about our
criminal system and alternatives to our system through consideration
of such forces? This investigation opens up vast areas of inquiry, and
thus the aim here is merely to touch on several possibilities, leaving
further exploration for future scholarship.
A.

Desire to Dignify

As mentioned earlier, one way in which the term “victim” has been
understood is as a way of according respect and dignity, 396 and of
acknowledging harm. 397 There is a scholarly consensus that this nation
has often failed those who have come forward to allege crimes,
particularly those from marginalized groups. Those failures have
included disbelief that the alleged act occurred, 398 or, even if it occurred,
that it inflicted a harm that mattered. 399 “Victim” is a term that can be
deployed to combat all those tendencies, because it can potentially
convey the existence of harm, crime, and impact on a life that matters.
It can assert that invasions of bodily integrity and property rights are
harms that are taken seriously. So it may be that pre-adjudication use
of this term is fueled at least in part by a desire to display, as quickly as
possible, trust, acknowledgement of harm, and acknowledgement of
worth.
There are irreconcilable tensions in using this word for these
purposes in these contexts, however. First, in the kind of context on
which this Article focuses, to use the word “victim” risks resolving a
See United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp.2d 319, 325–26 (2005) (acknowledging the issue).
See supra Section II.A. Note that the backers of Marsy’s Law chose to invoke respect and
dignity on the ballot in Kentucky and Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Election Ballot, supra note 13 (“Are
you in favor of providing constitutional rights to victims of crime, including the right to be
treated fairly, with dignity and respect, and the right to be informed and to have a voice in the
judicial process?”); see also League of Woman Voters of Pa. v. Boockvar, No. 578 M.D. 2019, 2019
Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 623 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 30, 2019) (noting that the Pennsylvania
ballot question, which invokes “fairness, respect and dignity” for “crime victims,” “omits all of
the many changes to existing constitutional provisions affording rights to the accused”); see also
Ohio Issue 1, Marsy’s Law Crime Victim Rights Initiative (2017), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Issue_1,_Marsy%27s_Law_Crime_Victim_Rights_Initiative_
(2017) [https://perma.cc/2EWP-KGXE] (Ohio ballot question invoking “due process, respect,
fairness, and justice”).
397 See supra Section I.B.
398 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility
Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2017).
399 See id. at 27–28.
395
396
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question—whether a crime occurred—that is meant to be resolved via
evidentiary and criminal processes, and may pose a threat to criminal
defendants and to the system that prosecutes them. But second, if part
of what fuels the call for victimhood to be proclaimed from the earliest
moment is a sense of the need to respect those who have been
disrespected, to value those who have been devalued, and to honor the
bodily integrity and property rights of those for whom they have been
always uncertain, our criminal system is an inapt place to turn.
Historically and still, this system disproportionately targets people of
color, and particularly African-Americans; historically and still, it
devalues time, lives, life goals, and family ties; 400 historically and still, it
tramples on bodily integrity and exacerbates racialized wealth
disparities.
Scholars have made the case that a system that is “built upon the
dehumanization of the Black body,” 401 and other forms of racial
subordination, 402 lacks the credibility to say that it can protect Black
“victims.” 403 That more broadly, a system that has wrought such harm
on vulnerable groups cannot credibly champion them. 404 That a system
that imposes such harm, pain, damage, death, and exposure to sexual

See Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, supra note 2, at 2517–18.
Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass
Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 989 (2019) (stating that “the dehumanization and
denigration of the Black body” is inherent to “the modern-day criminal justice system”).
402 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Who Locked Us Up? Examining the Social Meaning of
Black Punitiveness, 127 YALE L.J. 2388, 2393–94 (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING
P OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)); Elisabeth Epps, Amber
Guyger Should Not Go To Prison, THE APPEAL (Oct. 7, 2019), https://theappeal.org/amberguyger-botham-jean [https://perma.cc/N28P-JJYM] (“If we are ever to dismantle white
supremacy, we must be willing to consider that its chief foot servant, the criminal legal system,
must be abolished . . . .”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist
Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597, 1604 (2017) (“[T]hese institutions enforce an undemocratic
racial caste system originating in slavery.”).
403 See Micah Herskind, Some Reflections on Prison Abolition, MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 2019),
https://medium.com/@micahherskind/some-reflections-on-prison-abolition-after-mumi5197a4c3cf98 [https://perma.cc/L3Y2-QWE2] (“The history of mass incarceration unequivocally
teaches us that embracing criminalization in any form means embracing anti-Blackness. It
teaches us that if we want to combat harm, we must attack and dismantle, rather than put any
faith in, all systems of criminalization.”).
404 See I. India Thusi, Harm, Sex, and Consequences, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 159, 193 (“The
criminal legal system has subordinated and controlled people of color from Johannesburg to Los
Angeles. Attempts to use it to vindicate people of color from social ‘harm,’ even the presumed
harms of patriarchy, must be viewed suspiciously.”); Laurie Schipper & Beth Barnhill, We’re
Victims’ Rights Advocates, and We Opposed Marsy’s Law, ACLU (May 16, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/were-victims-rights-advocates-and-weopposed-marsys-law [https://perma.cc/72SU-37CX] (“[R]outinely, biases based on race, gender,
or immigration status result in the arrest of victims seeking assistance.”).
400
401
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and other violence cannot credibly be called upon to address claims of
harm, pain, damage, death, or sexual and other violence. 405
Even if respect and dignity are accorded to the complainant, they
are contingent in nature; as described above, her worth inflates or
deflates according to her usefulness to the project of prosecution and
conviction. 406 And if she were one day to be the accused—indeed,
potentially the same day 407—that respect and dignity would dissolve.
B.

Tendency to Assume Guilt

One might also read this usage as simply a manifestation of a
tendency to assume crime (and thus a component of guilt)
prematurely. 408 If we tend to see an accusation of crime as tantamount
to a crime, then perhaps it is unsurprising that it is common to see
“victim” even before the existence or not of a crime has been
adjudicated. In support of this proposition, one can point to a whole
range of other usages that could be read as conveying similar premature
assumptions: “offender” in place of “arrestee,” 409 “offense” in place of
“alleged offense,” 410 and “recidivism” referring to re-arrest, 411 as well as
pre-adjudication uses of “crime scene,” 412 “murder weapon,” 413 “fleeing
felon,” 414 and so on. If one holds the view that such premature
assumptions are common—whether because of media, or as a result of
how people are treated pre-adjudication, or because of race- and class405 See, e.g., Victoria Law, Against Carceral Feminism, JACOBIN (Oct. 17, 2014),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/10/against-carceral-feminism
[https://perma.cc/Z56UCPAH] (“[P]olice are often purveyors of violence and . . . prisons are always sites of violence.”).
406 See Mary Margaret Giannini, The Procreative Power of Dignity: Dignity’s Evolution in the
Victims’ Rights Movement, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 43, 64 (2016) (discussing Kantian and other sources
for the notion that dignity is incompatible with the treatment of people as a means to an end, and
the tension between that notion and the treatment of complainants in the criminal system, in
which they “are very much objects that may enhance and aid the government in reaching its
goals, but otherwise are not honored participants in the process”); Symposium, Domestic
Violence in Legal Education and Legal Practice: A Dialogue Between Professors and Practitioners,
11 J.L. & POL'Y 409 (2003).
407 See, for example, the practice of issuing “cross-complaints,” i.e., charging both of those
involved in an alleged assault.
408 Note that while I certainly see the charge or arrest stage as premature, in other work I have
remarked upon the tendency of legal scholars to put excessive faith in the meaning and reliability
of convictions. See supra Section III.C.
409 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 1008–09.
410 See id.
411 See id.
412 See supra Section III.B.
413 See supra Section III.B.
414 See supra Section III.B.
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bias, 415 or because we long for certainty, or a combination of the
above—then steering people away from “victim” may do little or
nothing to tackle these underlying problems.
C.

Influence of Law Enforcement Framing

This usage presents a useful opportunity to consider some of the
dimensions and dominance of law enforcement framing. 416 Courts
often explain the pre-adjudication use of “victim” by saying that it is the
term that law enforcement uses, sometimes adding that it is a “neutral”
and “concise” term. 417 Courts tend not to mention the possibility that it
is selected and maintained because of its usefulness to law enforcement,
because it helps to frame a situation in a certain way. Certainly, there
may be instances where the usage is so ingrained that a prosecutor truly
could not stop herself from blurting it out, 418 but there is a reason that
these usages are so common as to have become ingrained. Scholars have
identified the tendency of “victims’ rights” initiatives to aid law
enforcement; 419 there are thus good reasons why law enforcement might
choose to reinforce the language of “victims” in the pre-adjudication
context.
There is room for deeper scholarly consideration of the impact of
various types of law enforcement framing, 420 whether that framing
involves shaping the statements or alleged statements of suspects, 421
415 See Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and Support
for Punitive Policies, SENTENCING PROJECT 13 (Sep. 3, 2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/
publications/race-and-punishment-racial-perceptions-of-crime-and-support-for-punitivepolicies [https://perma.cc/7FY3-K4UK] (“A number of studies have shown that Americans, and
whites in particular, strongly associate crime with racial minorities, and racial minorities with
crime.”).
416 See supra Section II.B.1 (for examples of courts attributing the appearance of “victim” in
the courtroom to prosecutorial indictments or police usage).
417 See, e.g., Davis v. State, No. 05-18-00398-CR, 2019 WL 2442883, at *2 (Tex. App. June 12,
2019) (stating that “the word ‘victim’ is mild, non-prejudicial, and is commonly used at trial in a
neutral manner to describe the events in question”); Noguera v. LeGrand, No. 3:11-cv-00428LRH-WGC, 2017 WL 2190062, at *5 (D. Nev. May 18, 2017) (“Perhaps, the phrase ‘alleged victim’
would have been preferable, but, in each of the instructions Noguera challenges, the word ‘victim’
was a clear and concise way to refer to the person who was object of the defendant’s alleged
acts.”).
418 See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
419 See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 108, at 1698–1704.
420 See Steven Chermak, Image Control: How the Police Affect the Presentation of Crime News,
14 AM. J. POLICE, no. 2, 1995, at 21, 21 [https://perma.cc/6F5Y-GVYB] (referring to a “significant
limitation of the literature”).
421 See Mitchell P. Schwartz, Compensating Victims of Police-Fabricated Confessions, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1127–30 (2003).

1504

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:4

coordinating with the media, 422 or other types of public relations
work, 423 of which careful vocabulary choice is one example. 424 There is
room for introspection by scholars and others regarding the extent to
which law enforcement framing has come to be our framing, 425 has
come to seem natural or neutral. 426 The police may label “perpetrators,”
“offenders,” “victims,” and “recidivists,” before an adjudicative process
has played out, but then so may scholars and judges. 427 This framing

422 See Chermak, supra note 420 (“Police departments actively construct public images of
themselves so that news presentation benefits the organization rather than harms it. Existing
research on police behavior has focused on how police fight crime, provide services, and maintain
order, ignoring how police behave to control their presentation in the news media.”).
423 See Maya Lau, Police PR Machine Under Scrutiny for Inaccurate Reporting, Alleged ProCop Bias, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 30, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/202008-30/police-public-relations
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210104131828/https://www.
latimes.com/california/story/2020-08-30/police-public-relations]; Somil Trivedi & Nicole
Gonzalez Van Cleve, To Serve and Protect Each Other: How Police-Prosecutor Codependence
Enables Police Misconduct, 100 B.U. L. REV. 895, 901 (2020) (describing the “common public
relations ‘spin’” after “police-involved shootings”).
424 See Johnson & Naureckas, supra note 334 (saying, as regards the word “juvenile,” being
used by the police in place of “child,” that it is part of “an institutional lexicon developed over
decades of public relations fine-tuning”).
425 See, e.g., Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Race to Judgment: Stereotyping Media
and Criminal Defendants, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 95-96 (2008) (“In covering crime stories,
journalists typically rely on law-enforcement officials’ views, downplaying the defense
perspective while minimally acknowledging the innocence presumption. Thus, news of crime
generally exhibits a pro-prosecution bias, rooted most importantly in this dependence of
reporters on official and, therefore, purportedly credible sources.” (internal citation omitted));
Adam H. Johnson (@adamjohnsonNYC), TWITTER (Apr. 5, 2018, 11:33 AM),
https://twitter.com/adamjohnsonNYC/status/981917661515960322 (appending comment “[I]
see the New York Times has mind-readers on staff” to New York Times story headlined “Police
Fatally Shoot a Brooklyn Man After Falsely Believing He Had a Gun”); Benjamin Mueller & Nate
Schweber, Police Fatally Shoot a Brooklyn Man, Saying They Thought He Had a Gun, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/nyregion/police-shooting-brooklyncrown-heights.html [https://perma.cc/W9Z3-AYLF] (subsequent version of headline).
426 See, e.g., Davis v. State, No. 05-18-00398-CR, 2019 WL 2442883, at *2 (Tex. App. June 12,
2019) (stating that “the word ‘victim’ is mild, non-prejudicial, and is commonly used at trial in a
neutral manner to describe the events in question”); Cueva v. Stephens, No. 2:14-CV-417, 2016
WL 4014088, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2016) (same).
427 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of
Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1379 (“The first colonists imported
the English common law tradition of private prosecutions. Under this system, victims of felonies
had a right to initiate and prosecute a criminal case against their offenders.”); Roberts,
Convictions as Guilt, supra note 2, at 2537–39 (2020) (citing Alice Ristroph on risk of propaganda
in the criminal academy); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal
Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2061 (2017) (“Deploying legitimacy theory and procedural
justice as a diagnosis and solution to the current policing crisis might even imply, at some level,
that the problem of policing is better understood as a result of African American criminality than
as a badge and incident of race-and class-based subjugation.”).
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risks shaping thought; risks making law enforcement in effect the last
word on whether a crime occurred.
An increased awareness of the spread and influence of law
enforcement terminology may expand awareness of a broader
phenomenon of which this often forms a part: the use of terms that tend
to prop up the criminal system by making it seem at worst redeemable,
and at best essential. Even in the words of reform-minded scholars, it is
common to see the use of “lenience” to characterize sentences or bail
amounts; 428 “mercy” to describe acts of executive discretion; and
“progressive prosecutor” to describe those who are, or who proclaim
themselves to be, at the less punitive end of the prosecutorial spectrum.
It is important to examine all these terms and interrogate the notions
that they appear to be furthering. Can sentences be said to be lenient,
merely because they are shorter than others in our prison-hungry
system? Can bail—requiring the legally innocent to attempt to buy their
freedom—ever be lenient? Is it mercy at the end of the system’s
workings to turn back from some worst-case outcome? Can one
wielding the tools of this system be said to be progressive? 429 Certainly
one could respond that “relative(ly)” is to be read into this kind of
expression, but this is at best a feeble and fluctuating understanding. 430
It is important to note these terms, what they imply and whom they
benefit, and how it is that they start to seem neutral. Understanding
them, and moving away from them, may help us to see with clearer eyes
both the criminal system and those who are caught up in it.
D.

Reflection of Reality

Another possibility is that this usage—which blurs the supposedly
central line between accusation of crime and finding of crime, and thus
in at least some instances the supposedly central line between
accusation of guilt and finding of guilt 431—persists because it matches
our blurry reality. In other words, while this usage might be in
irreconcilable tension with our criminal system’s core tenets, and with
See Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, supra note 2, at 2537–49 (critiquing this usage).
See, e.g., Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748 (2018);
Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal Justice Reform,”
128 YALE L.J. F. 848, 924–29 (2019).
430 See Andrew Crespo (@andrewmcrespo), TWITTER (Aug. 11, 2020, 11:04 PM),
https://twitter.com/AndrewMCrespo/status/1293382896829554689?s=20 (“I agree that there is a
comparative way to use the term ‘progressive prosecutor.’ (Although I think the phrase is
typically deployed as a binary, as in ‘X *is* a PP’ rather than ‘X is a *more* PP than Y.’”)).
431 For example, where a defendant agrees that a sexual encounter occurred but claims that it
was consensual, or agrees that a homicide occurred but denies that it was criminal.
428
429
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what we tell ourselves about the system, it might be reflective of the
system as it actually exists.
We tell ourselves of a system where we apply the most rigorous
procedural protections because the stigma is the greatest, and the
exposure to punishment unique. 432 We tell ourselves of a system where
every component of guilt has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
at trial, 433 based on admissible evidence, and with neutral fact-finders
who not only apply the relevant legal standards to the admissible
evidence but also apply community standards of culpability. 434 And we
tell ourselves that it is not until that highest burden of proof has been
applied—and the defendant has had a chance to tell her story, aided by
a vigorous advocate who had the chance to proffer evidence and
arguments and defenses to rebut the government’s account—that we
permit punishment to occur. Up until that point of course we apply the
presumption of innocence. 435
But it’s perhaps in words like “victim” that reminders of the reality
peep through. Perhaps that supposedly central line of adjudication, said
to be so carefully policed by the rules of procedure, the rules of evidence,
and our constitutional guarantees, is frequently just a blur, with the
most vital dividing lines lying elsewhere. Perhaps, for some, it’s the
moment when you are born, for example. 436 Or perhaps, as Jocelyn
Simonson has argued, the setting of bail may serve as the true
adjudicative moment. 437 Certainly the idea that the true dividing line
occurs pre-adjudication is supported by not only bail and preadjudication detention, but by pre-adjudication billing of defendants
See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Note, for example, the prevalence of “pre-trial” as a descriptor of adjudicative stages or
processes or detention, despite the fact that far more often the relevant stage is “pre-plea.”
434 After all, some crime definitions require normative judgment. See, e.g., Jody Armour,
Where Bias Lives in the Criminal Law and its Processes: How Judges and Jurors Socially Construct
Black Criminals, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 219–21 (2018).
435 See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, DNA Exonerations and the Elusive Promise of Criminal
Justice Reform, Wrongful Convictions and the DNA Revolution: Twenty-Five Years of Freeing the
Innocent, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 271, 277 (2017) (“[O]ur criminal justice system exists in order
to sort the guilty from the innocent.”).
436 See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 413 (1996) (mentioning the “oft-unstated assumption that
blacks are still on probation” and “are not necessarily granted a presumption of innocence”)
(quoting ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS: WHY ARE MIDDLE-CLASS BLACKS
ANGRY? WHY SHOULD AMERICA CARE? 72 (1993)); Michael Pinard, Race Decriminalization and
Criminal Legal System Reform, 95 N.Y.U.L. REV. ONLINE 119, 119 (2020) (describing “the reality
that simply being Black has been and will continue to be criminalized”).
437 See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 585 (2017) (“[F]or
indigent defendants [bail] often serves the function that a real trial might, producing guilty pleas
and longer sentences when an individual cannot afford to pay their bail.”).
432
433
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for attorneys, 438 ankle monitors, 439 global positioning systems, 440 and
jail, 441 and by a variety of other consequences of arrest and charge. 442
More than one scholar and judge has referred to pre-adjudication
hardships as a form of punishment, 443 thus challenging the
constitutional mandate that punishment be imposed only postconviction. 444
Key aspects of the guilty plea process support this notion of a blur
where one might assume a sharp dividing line. David Shapiro pointed
out that probable cause—the standard of proof required for an arrest—
typically suffices for the acceptance of a guilty plea, the means by which
the vast bulk of convictions are imposed. 445 Arrests may rely entirely on
a law enforcement account, 446 and a guilty plea has the same core
evidentiary requirement. 447 Potential defenses may end up being barely
more salient at the guilty plea stage than at the arrest stage, 448 and the
give-and-take nature of repeat players’ plea bargaining may deter
aggressive defense litigation. 449 Finally, the judgment of the community

See John D. King, Privatizing Criminal Procedure, 107 GEO. L.J. 561, 568 (2019).
See Ava Kofman, Digital Jail: How Electronic Monitoring Drives Defendants Into Debt,
ProPublica (July, 3 2019, 5 A.M.), https://www.propublica.org/article/digital-jail-howelectronic-monitoring-drives-defendants-into-debt [https://perma.cc/LD66-LYXQ].
440 See Aaron Cantú, When Innocent Until Proven Guilty Costs $400 a Month—and Your
Freedom, VICE (May 28, 2020, 1:09 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4ayv4d/wheninnocent-until-proven-guilty-costs-dollar400-a-monthand-your-freedom?utm_campaign=
sharebutton [https://perma.cc/B76L-T446].
441 See Steven Hale, Pretrial Detainees are Being Billed for their Stay in Jail, THE APPEAL (July
20,
2018),
https://theappeal.org/pretrial-detainees-are-being-billed-for-their-stay-in-jail
[https://perma.cc/NMS7-9U8E].
442 See, e.g., Judith G. McMullen, Invisible Stripes: The Problem of Youth Criminal Records, 27
S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 23–24, 34–35 (2018).
443 See Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327 (2017).
444 See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1303 (2012) (describing pretrial detention as
involving “conditions tantamount to punishment”).
445 See David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 43–
44 (1984).
446 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 991.
447 See Shapiro, supra note 445, at 42–44 (stating that a summary by law enforcement of
evidence providing a “factual basis” for a plea is probably sufficient where it establishes probable
cause).
448 See id.
449 Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 582 (2014).
438
439

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

1508

[Vol. 42:4

is absent from guilty pleas, 450 as is the requirement of a neutral factfinder, or indeed any fact-finder. 451
Even when trials do occur, their reality in our under-resourced
system challenges the stories we tell of how the dividing line is honored
and policed, of how it acts to distinguish adjudication from charge.
Numerous restrictions exist on the ability of defendants to mount
defenses or tell their stories, 452 on jurors’ ability to focus solely on the
admissible evidence, 453 to honor the presumption of innocence, 454 and
to apply the correct burden of proof, 455 and on the extent to which the
jury represents the community. 456 Exceptions of course are possible,
when the appropriate line is faithfully and rigorously policed. But in the
vast bulk of cases, perhaps the crucial moment is indeed the issuing of
a charge; perhaps the use of “victim” regardless of whether adjudication
has occurred reflects the difficulty of getting beyond—of challenging or
countering—governmental assertions that a crime occurred and that
someone was victimized.
E.

Rough and Ready Sense of Crime

A final phenomenon that this usage helps to illustrate is the
widespread presence of a kind of “shadow criminal law:” a concept of
crime (including a concept of “victims”) that does not rely on formal
criminal concepts, elements, or definitions. A kind of “I know it when I
see it” concept. 457 This is understandable—we need a way to refer to the
450 See W. Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 14), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3542575 (“Rhetorically, at least, it seems the jury’s desuetude has left a populist gap in need of
filling”); id. at 40 (suggesting that “the modern-day demise of jury trials opened a distinctly
democratic hole in our institutions”).
451 See Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, supra note 2, at 2520–21.
452 See generally id. (discussing, for example, failures to provide defense counsel, or defense
counsel with adequate resources); Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background:” Should the
Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation, 3 L. & INEQ. 9 (1985)
(describing insanity as the “rich man’s defense”) (internal citation omitted).
453 See id.
454 See id. at 2512; Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai, & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial
Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 207 (2010)
(discussing study designed by the authors that found, “[First,] that participants held implicit
associations between Black and Guilty. Second, we found that these implicit associations were
meaningful—they predicted judgments of the probative value of evidence”).
455 See Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, supra note 2.
456 See id.
457 See, for example, statutes criminalizing a failure to report in circumstances where one
“knows” that a crime has been/ is being committed. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 21921.22(A) (2013).
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kind of thing whose legal version is litigated in court: rapes, murders,
crimes, victims, and so on. But this phenomenon can jeopardize the
protections that the law sets up, such as mens rea requirements and
defenses. 458
Thus, for some of the judges mentioned above it is
unproblematic—natural and appropriate even—for the person whose
death is the focus of a homicide trial to be referred to as a “victim.” And
of course that seems right if we are focused on common parlance, in
which the word “victim” does not necessarily imply crime or guilt: we
speak of “victims of circumstance,” for example. But when we enter
criminal legal fora in which definitions are in play, and in which the
existence of a “victim” suggests the existence of a crime, this rough-andready usage becomes more problematic. As described above, 459 it risks
obscuring the role that justificatory defenses (such as self-defense) are
supposed to play: where a justificatory defense is satisfied, after all, there
is no crime. It risks obscuring the role of the defense attorney, which is
not to “get someone off,” but to play a part in the process that leads to
a decision as to whether a crime appears to have occurred. 460 It risks
obscuring the nuanced components of crimes, such as mens rea, and in
general expanding the cloud of criminality beyond its already vast
spread.
We see this shadow criminal law again in the equating of claim and
crime. 461 As mentioned above, 462 even a truthful claim of a crime does
not necessarily translate to a crime. This concept needs to be reinforced
because it is frequently obscured in criminal legal discussions that rely
on reports or claims or arrests to denote crimes. When we speak of preadjudication “victims” and express concern about the rates at which
“crimes,” or “murders,” or “rapes” are committed, reported, enforced,
or solved, and when all of this rests on pre-adjudication data—whether
arrests, claims, or charges—our language is in tension with a system
that defines crime, murder, and rape legally, in part to ensure that the
label of crime is cabined and in part to ensure that defenses can be
proffered and things like mens rea can be contested.
There may be a hopeful coda here, however. While the concern at
issue centers on a risk that we deemphasize crucial aspects of the law’s
structure and protections—defenses and elements such as mens rea—it
458 See Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, supra note 22, at 1016–17 (stating that “in the assumptions
of the police and the public and sometimes of legal scholars, establishment of an act (or even an
assertion thereof) frequently seems to be taken as establishment of a crime”).
459 See supra Section I.B.
460 See Erin Murphy, Indigent Defense, CHAMPION, Jan/Feb. 2002, at 33.
461 See, e.g., supra Section II.B.2.
462 See supra Section II.B.3.
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is worth considering where the emphasis tends to lie instead. As
mentioned above, when judges insist that we have a “victim,” even when
the defendant is arguing self-defense, it seems that the judges are
influenced by the fact that, legal arguments as to crime notwithstanding,
we do indubitably have a harm. 463 And it seems that to those judges a
word like “victim” that can be taken as acknowledging the harm is
acceptable—desirable even. And so, if one starts to feel that a system
infused by law enforcement rhetoric, deeply hampered in its ability to
guarantee accurate adjudication, in tension with the community’s sense
of crime, unable to offer dignity and respect in any consistent way, and
inclined to blur its core dividing line needs to be abandoned, one can
see a kernel of hope right at the law’s center: judges who lean away from
definitions of crime in favor of an alternative centering principle,
namely harm. To do this is threatening to a system that purports to
criminalize only when a crime in all its nuance has been established. But
it is hopeful, perhaps, in that it points to a different regime, one invoked
by abolitionists, who identify harm as a more desirable focus than
crime, 464 whose theories and practice are built around that focus, and
who strive toward respect, dignity, and bodily integrity for all. 465 It
undermines the argument that a focus on harm is alien or unattainable.
A consideration of the pre-adjudication use of “victim” thus
affords an opportunity to reflect on ways in which the criminal system’s
operation diverts from its official portrayal. That reflection might
prompt a sense that those things that we’re commonly said to have
aren’t guaranteed—not the protection of our highest burden of proof,
not the precise definitions of an area of law governed by statutes and
attentive to defenses, not the fierce protection of the presumption of
innocence, not a central and carefully policed dividing-line between
accusation and finding of guilt, not conviction as the key moment, not
really evidence as the basis for adjudication, and not really even crime
See supra Section I.B.
See Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781,
1825 (2020) (“Abolitionists are working for a world without police—and so they are making
demands and running experiments that decrease the power, footprint, and legitimacy of police
while building alternative modes of responding to collective needs and interpersonal harm.”);
Herskind, supra note 403 (mentioning Mariame Kaba’s reflection that “for abolitionists, the unit
of analysis is harm, whether that harm is labeled criminal or not. And it is precisely because of
abolitionists’ focus on harm that they are against prisons—because prisons, as a rule, harm
people”).
465 See, e.g., Camp, supra note 337, at 1723 (“Accountability interventions that protect the
dignity of wrongdoers are more likely to have a positive impact on behavior change than are
shame-driven ones.”); Reina Gossett & Dean Spade, Prison Abolition and Prefiguring the World
You Want to Live In, YOUTUBE (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
XDQlW1uJ8uQ [https://perma.cc/7TWK-J8GL] (mentioning “the belief that we are all
indisposable”).
463
464
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as the guiding principle. Rather, we have a system that doles out the
criminal system’s unique harshness without its justificatory precision
and protections. And at the same time, we don’t have a system that
provides what the word “victim” and the attendant rights are said to be
striving toward: respect and dignity.
The advance of abolition into mainstream discussions of criminal
law makes this kind of consideration particularly timely. An
appropriate part of evaluating arguments for abolition is to consider
what it is that we have now: not the idealized version, to which one
might be inclined to cling, 466 but the actual version, out beyond the
labeling and unsupported precepts. This consideration might make
abolitionist ideas appealing in that they involve a rejection of our
system. But it might also make them appealing—or at least less
daunting—by unsettling the supposedly stark divide between our
existing criminal system and stepping away from it; and by unsettling
the sense of impracticality, of fantasy. 467 Suppose that what’s said above
is right: that we already have a somewhat loose grip on the centrality of
crime as a governing principle; that harm is what moves us, more than
crime as tightly defined; that the structural and definitional integrity
that we may have thought was there isn’t; 468 that we already seem
motivated by the community’s sense of when it is that action is needed
and accountability to be demanded; 469 and that we indeed yearn for
466 See Daniel Epps on how our account of the system’s erring on the side of “freeing the
innocent” might assuage potential concerns. Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal
Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1150 (2015). Who wouldn’t be nervous about what would
happen to “victims,” and about “violent offenders” and “violent recidivists,” given current “crime
rates,” were we to reframe our society without criminal enforcement? Who wouldn’t be loath to
let go of a system that sorts carefully and errs on the side of the innocent? If you see the criminal
system as a reliable and fair one in which both sides are heard and community judgment and the
highest standard of proof applied and the finding is that we have someone who made a free choice
to do evil, and to violate the law and norms of the community, then of course you might get
nervous about that being taken away.
467 See Roger Lancaster, How to End Mass Incarceration, JACOBIN (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/mass-incarceration-prison-abolition-policing
[https://perma.cc/8RR9-DT7J] (mentioning “pie-in-the-sky imaginings”); see also Jasmine
Sankofa, Mapping the Blank: Centering Black Women’s Vulnerability to Police Sexual Violence to
Upend Mainstream Police Reform, 59 HOW. L.J. 651, 689 (2016) (suggesting that the absence of
scholarly engagement with abolition is often due to the “conceptualization of abolition as
impractical and ‘foolish’”).
468 See Akbar, supra note 31 (“Abolitionists are often caricatured as having unattainable ends
and an impractical agenda. But many organizations, like Survived and Punished and
generationFIVE have demonstrated the failure of our system even on its own terms . . . .”).
469 See Bill Keller, What do Abolitionists Really Want?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 13,
2019),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/06/13/what-do-abolitionists-really-want
[https://perma.cc/FW6C-2XEA] (mentioning the abolitionist objective of devolving
responsibility for public safety to local communities).
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ways to embody respect and dignity. Acknowledging that might make
less alarming the exploration of abolitionist goals and practices, in
which the guiding principles do indeed center harm rather than crime,
and respect and dignity that are universal. 470
CONCLUSION
Written into the law throughout this country—in every state’s
statutes and most states’ constitutions, in jury instructions, and in the
words of judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and witnesses—is a
merger of accuser and victimized, of alleged crime and crime, of the
processes pre-adjudication and post, and thus potentially a challenge to
the presumption of innocence and our processes of adjudication. And
all often without attention or discussion; all so normalized as to appear
to many to be “neutral,” to be just how people talk, to be just a bit of
shorthand. 471 But we need to be careful, both about what these usages
may reveal and about what they may exacerbate. 472 “Victims’ rights” are
growing in number and in reach; they attach to these language choices;
they derogate from defendants’ rights and protections; and they do little
to serve the deepest needs of those harmed by crime and of a society
harmed by punitivism.

470 See, e.g., Camp, supra note 337, at 1723 (“Accountability interventions that protect the
dignity of wrongdoers are more likely to have a positive impact on behavior change than are
shame-driven ones.”); Gossett & Spade, supra note 465 (mentioning “the belief that we are all
indisposable”).
471 See, e.g., State v. Harvey, No. 29513-3-III, 2012 WL 1071234, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar.
29, 2012) (“[V]ictim” may be “as the State suggests, a shorthand reference to the recipient of a
bullet.”); State v. Thompson, 76 A.3d 273, 288 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (calling the prosecutor’s
repeatedly violative usages “mostly ill-chosen short-form references to the complainant”).
472 See MO. REV. STAT. 595.209 (“The rights of the victims granted in this section are absolute
and the policy of this state is that the victim’s rights are paramount to the defendant’s rights.”);
Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s Rights Amendment, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 579, 582 (1998) (“‘Victims’ rights’ were—and are—used to counter ‘defendants’
rights’ and to trump those rights if possible.”).

